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Chapter 1
Introduction
According to the fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), the atmospheric carbon concentration is expected to
rise further during the 21st century. This will lead to a significant increase of
the frequency, the intensity and the duration of extreme climate events (Pachauri
et al., 2014). In recent decades, Switzerland has already been increasingly affected
by extreme climate events. The Swiss cannot forget the heat waves of 2003 and
2006, and the floods of 1999 and 2005, because of the devastation and damage
these extreme events caused.
For more than two decades, mitigation, i.e. strategies which aim to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, has been the main objective of international climate
policy. However, due to already high atmospheric carbon concentrations and the
inertia of the climate system, climate change is unavoidable to some degree,
even if today’s emissions were almost completely cut back. Along with the
high uncertainty concerning future climate change policies, this fact has focused
attention towards measures which allow for reducing the climate vulnerability of
communities and regions without the need of international cooperation. As for
example Buob and Stephan (2013) have shown, optimal climate change strategies
require a combination of both mitigation and adaptation strategies, and should
include measures of adjustment to the actual or expected climate and its effects
(Pachauri et al., 2014). These measures can be implemented on a national or
regional scale with sufficient speed and scope.
The Swiss Federal Councils strategy, Adaptation to climate change in
Switzerland, was published in two parts in 2012 and 2014 by the Swiss Federal
Office for the Environment (FOEN). The report presents a summary of goals,
challenges and fields of action. Heat stress as well as an increased risk of flooding
are identified as two (out of eight) main adaptation challenges in Switzerland.
Furthermore, the rise of the snowline is mentioned, which further increases the
risk of flooding. In its report, the Swiss Federal Council formulates several
principles according to which adaptation should be organized in Switzerland. 1
The first principle requires policy makers to adapt sustainably, which means that
adaptation measures have to be flexible and the precautionary principle has to
apply. The second principle says that natural regulation processes should be
used, if possible, as well as measures with the best cost-benefit ratio, considering
market and non-market damages. No-regret measures and those with a secondary
benefit are to be favored. The third principle states that adaptation funding
should follow the costs-by-cause principle, but that, if necessary, the solidarity
principle applies. A further principle is to base all actions on scientific findings
and to use a risk approach as well as robust measures to deal with uncertainties.
Adaptation measures have to account for different time scales and should be
evaluated periodically. Another main principle of the Swiss adaptation strategy
is that adaptation measures have to be implemented as a result of cooperation
between the confederation, the cantons and the municipalities (FOEN, 2012),
which are the three levels of Swiss governance. Finally, the report explicitly
mentions that adaptation is a “complementary element of Swiss climate policy
in addition to the urgent need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” (FOEN, 2012).
Because of the threatened increase of extreme climate events, and they
damage they can cause, my thesis has three aims: (1) to better understand
the economic impacts of extreme climate events in Switzerland; (2) to develop
policy recommendations for financially funding adaptation measures; and (3) to
analyze the drivers of both.
The following chapters focus on heat waves and floods. What these two
extreme events have in common is that they have already caused major damage
in Switzerland, and their frequency, intensity and duration is expected to increase
1These principles will be taken into account throughout this thesis.
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further as atmospheric carbon concentrations rise during the 21st century (FOEN,
2012). However, these two event types differ strongly with respect to the damage
they cause. On the one hand, there is so-called market damage such as destroyed
capital and land. This damage can be expressed directly in monetary units by
using market prices for capital and land. On the other hand, there is non-market
damage for which no prices exist such as, for example, fatalities, a decrease in
biodiversity, or heat stress. While heat wave damage is predominantly a non-
market type - e.g. an increase in heat induced morbidity and mortality (Grizea
et al., 2005; EM-DAT, 2016) - damage from floods can almost completely be
expressed in monetary units e.g. destroyed land, mobile and immobile capital.
While an extreme can produce direct damage, we also observe indirect effects
resulting from an economy’s response to the direct damage, independent of the
nature of the extreme climate event. Destroyed input factors and output losses
always cause indirect or general equilibrium effects. This is true in the case of
heat waves and in the case of floods and fatalities (which in economic terms,
refers to the loss of consumers and labor supply). Therefore, in chapters 3 and 4,
I use general equilibrium models to measure direct and indirect damage caused
by extreme climate events, and to analyze different adaptation strategies meant
to moderate their impact.
To understand the economics of adaptation, we have to distinguish between
different forms of adaptation. On the one hand, adaptation might be in the self-
interest of economic agents and would therefore be carried out autonomously
by private agents. Such examples include the decision to buy insurance or
to choose a specific region of residence depending on the region’s exposure to
climate extremes. On the other hand, adaptation can have the characteristics
of a (local) public good. Such examples include investing in flood-resistant
public infrastructure, pursuing spatial planning measures, or running information
campaigns to raise public awareness of the potential risks of extreme climate
events. In many cases, we may observe spillover effects since the agents who
benefit from adaptation are typically not identical to those who bear the costs
of such. The Swiss adaptation policy stresses both autonomous and public
adaptation, as well as the costs-by-cause principle.
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Private agents (i.e. autonomous adaptation) and public authorities should
coordinate their actions (FOEN, 2012; Mendelsohn, 2000).
Adaptation measures differ with respect to timing. Proactive or anticipatory
adaptation measures must be planned in advance to become effective. Such
examples include building dams or pursuing spatial planning. In contrast,
reactive measures, such as piling sandbags, almost immediately provide some
protection against extreme events. Based on the results of Burton (1996) and
Bosello (2004), we assume that proactive adaptation is more effective and more
efficient than reactive adaptation. Additionally, since the precautionary principle
is part of the Swiss adaptation strategy, this implies that proactive measures are
to be preferred to reactive ones.
Adaptation measures also differ with respect to their spatial scope. While
there are measures which only affect small areas such as, for example, a dam or a
protective forest, there are also other measures, such as information campaigns,
which have effects on at least the national level. The Swiss adaptation strategy
identifies this problem and aims to coordinate all actions between responsible
public authorities. Just how many adaptation measures get implemented usually
depends on a political decision-making process. Results vary from full adaptation
(where there are no residual damages left), to no adaptation at all, with, at
intermediate stages first and second-best solutions. In the case of first best
solutions, the optimal level of adaptation is derived from maximizing social
welfare. In this situation, the marginal costs of providing adaptation equal
the value of the marginal benefits (prevented direct damages) from adaptation.
Assuming that adaptation has the properties of a public good, the government
has different options to levy taxes in order to finance the necessary adaptation
measure. Depending on the tax base, different general equilibrium effects might
be observed. By analyzing different funding strategies, this thesis will prefer tax
schemes that follow the costs-by-cause principle first, and the solidarity principle
second. This is in accordance with the Swiss adaptation strategy.
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The disastrous European heat wave of 2003 triggered a variety of studies that
aimed (1) to estimate heat wave induced excess mortality rates (Vandentorren
et al., 2004; Conti et al., 2005; Grizea et al., 2005; Fouillet et al., 2006); (2) to
identify risk factors (Vandentorren et al., 2006; Foroni et al., 2007); and (3) to
estimate benefits expected from adaptation strategies (Ebi et al., 2004; Kovats
and Kristie, 2006; Wolf et al., 2010). The existing literature typically reports
benefits only in terms of numbers of reduced fatalities, or as reduced rates of
additional (excess) mortality and morbidity (Grizea et al., 2005; Mendelsohn and
Saher, 2011). Therefore, in chapter 22, we develop a damage function to assess,
in monetary terms, the (predominantly) non-market damage from heat waves. In
order to decide on adaptation strategies, we have to acquire knowledge about the
costs and benefits of adapting to heat waves. While it is relatively straightforward
to calculate the costs of an adaptation measure, calculating expected benefits
(measured in prevented damages) is substantially more demanding. This is
especially true for heat waves, which are predominantly characterized by non-
market damage. We need a credible empirical method to estimate damage from
heat waves in order to evaluate and compare different adaptation strategies.
An important issue in this context is the question of how to evaluate the cost
of a certain adaptation measure against the number of lives saved. While this
issue does not arise from an ethical point of view, it has to be answered during
the political process of implementing adaptation measures, where the costs and
benefits of measures have to be evaluated and compared. Our analysis is related
to a paper by Mendelsohn and Saher (2011). To estimate a damage function
for fatalities and market damage for a variety of extreme climate events, they
used a worldwide data set and ordinary least square regressions. Chapter 2
contributes to this discussion by assessing heat wave caused fatalities in terms of
financial cost by using the “value of a statistical life” approach. Our contribution
to the empirical literature on damage functions is twofold: (1) we support the
idea that any assumption on a functional form and/or model parameter of a
theoretical damage function should be rigorously tested; (2) we take a novel
econometric approach to deriving a non-market damage function based on an
exponential hurdle model. This accounts for the specific properties of non-
2Chapter 2 is co-authored with Stefan Boes
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market damage, which is zero in years with no heat wave and positive when
a heat wave occurs. The hurdle model separates modelling zero damage from
the conditional-on-positives part, thus closely following the theoretical literature.
Using longitudinal data and an exponential hurdle model, we derive a damage
function that accounts for the impacts of climate change over time and socio-
economic data. This approach can be used for policy recommendations, because
it enables us to estimate the expected damage of heat waves in monetary units
and evaluate them in comparison with the costs of any adaptation measure.
While floods usually have a regional impact, heat waves have a greater spatial
impact. Both disastrous heat waves in 2003 and 2006 affected almost all European
countries. This fact, along with the comprehensive database, enables us to extend
the spatial scope of our analysis from Switzerland to Europe.
Our results indicate that the probability of observing a heat wave is
determined by the average temperature, precipitation and temperature variability
in ten 5-year intervals from 1960 to 2009. Our results are consistent with those
from earlier studies (e.g., Scha¨r et al. (2004)). However, we do not find that
climate variables are associated with non-market damage in the conditional-on-
positives part, although there is some indication that both the age ratio (the share
of citizens older than 65 relative to those aged 15-64) and the population density
are positively associated with damage. Contrary to our presumption, we do not
find evidence that non-market damage is associated with GDP or the degree of
urbanization. With regards to the degree of urbanization, it is possible that the
data are not expedient enough on a national basis. However, the main implication
of our study is that demographic characteristics seem relatively more important
than the economic factors for non-market damage from heat waves. This finding
supports the strategy that adaptation should mainly target vulnerable groups in
the population.
Chapter 3 takes a computable general equilibrium approach to analyze direct
and indirect effects of heat waves in Switzerland as well as strategies to adapt
to them. Taking general equilibrium impacts into account is important for the
following reasons. First, not only do heat waves cause excessive deaths, they
also have an indirect effect on labor supply and the demand for consumption
6
goods and leisure. Hence, both the allocation of resources and the distribution
of income are affected. Second, if adaptation is a (local) public good, spillover
effects might occur. Third, both the public good character and the time delay
between the decision to implement adaptation measures and their first effects lead
to a discrepancy between the beneficiaries and those who bear the adaptation
costs. Fourth, the population is not uniformly hit by heat waves. As the impact
literature reports (Johnson et al., 2005; Haines et al., 2006), heat wave impacts
depend on age, income and the degree of urbanization in regions where affected
individuals reside. Those who suffer most are very young and very old people,
as well as those with pre-existing diseases. Poor people have fewer resources to
protect themselves than the wealthy. The so-called heat-island effect implies that
the urban population is more affected because of the infrastructure, architecture
and the limited amount of green areas. Urban areas heat up much faster and
cool down more slowly than rural ones (Baccini et al., 2008). As a consequence,
certain general equilibrium effects are systematically neglected when analyzing
damage from heat waves and adaptation strategies to them by sole focusing on
excess death or the monetarization of fatalities with the value of a statistical life.
However, these effects are important in designing efficient adaptation strategies
(Hallegatte et al., 2007).
On the one hand, the approach in chapter 3 is an improvement over the
approach used in chapter 2 because it takes a more global perspective. On the
other hand, the damage module of chapter 3 is much simpler than the one derived
in chapter 2. This is because we aim to monetarize damage in chapter 2, while we
analyze general equilibrium effects and account directly for fatalities in chapter
3. The damage module of chapter 3 is based on estimates made by Grizea et al.
(2005) on heat wave excess mortality3 during the 2003 heat wave in Switzerland.
3“[Heat wave excess mortality is the] mortality above what would be expected based on the
non-crisis mortality rate in the population of interest. Excess mortality is thus mortality that
is attributable to the crisis conditions. It can be expressed as a rate (the difference between
observed and non-crisis mortality rates) [...]” (Checci and Roberts, 2005).
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Chapter 3 aims to answer two main research questions: (1) What is the order
of magnitude of general equilibrium impacts of a 2003-like heat wave on the Swiss
economy? (2) If adaptation to heat waves is a public good, what are the diverse
economic effects of policies for financially funding optimal adaptation to heat
waves?
In contrast to an integrated assessment, we are running a policy evaluation
analysis, where heat waves are taken as given and where we analyze the effect of
policy driven adaptation to heat waves in Switzerland. Although an Auerbach-
Kotlikoff overlapping generations (OLG) model seems to be the most natural
way of introducing an age structure, it also requires one to assume that agents
are clairvoyant (Rasmussen and Rutherford, 2004). This assumption contradicts
the analysis of low-probability and high-impact events like heat waves. To avoid
this problem, we develop a static Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model
which zooms into one single period of a standard Auerbach-Kotlikoff model.
While we observe private and instantaneous adaptation in reaction to price
changes, we explicitly model adaptation as a public good with financial funding
realized through taxing either labor, capital, consumption or inheritance. As
our approach accounts for secondary effects, we are able to differentiate between
welfare losses and damage in the output, i.e. market damage that results from
lower labor supplies and total demand for consumer goods. We differentiate the
demand side with respect to three characteristics: age, income and urbanization
of the region of residence. We do this because these three characteristics to a
great extent define the vulnerability and adaptation capacity of households to
heat waves. Our model is based on Swiss income data that describe different
income type distributions between household groups of different age, income and
residential region.
Our approach has two main advantages: first, it makes it possible to do a
regionally differentiated analysis without requiring regional input-output tables.
Secondly, it enables us to compare different strategies to fund the provision of
the public good adaptation. We are able to show that heat waves impact cohorts
utility in an unadapted economy in substantially different ways. While young
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and less vulnerable cohorts profit (in welfare terms) from heat waves, vulnerable
but surviving cohorts have decreased welfare. This result shows that without
adaptation, vulnerable cohorts are worse off and might have fewer possibilities to
invest in private adaptation. Due to the capital flow to young cohorts, a heat wave
in a non-adapted economy increases overall social welfare. This positive impact of
heat waves comes at the expense of old and vulnerable cohorts that suffer either
because they lose their lives, or because they survive but face decreased utility.
These results support the findings of chapter 2, where we see that adaptation
measures should mainly target the vulnerable groups of the population. Addition-
ally, the results of chapter 3 show that (1) heat waves might cause a high number
of fatalities combined with a distribution effect, from which young, high income
people in suburban and urban regions can profit; (2) governmental provision of an
optimal adaptation stock can reduce heat wave excess mortality at the expense of
a relatively low labor (0.4%), capital (0.5%) or consumption (0.2%) tax; and (3)
an inheritance tax is unsuitable to finance an optimal adaptation stock, because
an increase in mortality increases the tax basis. Overall, we show that it is
possible, at relatively low economic costs (about 0.2% of the GDP), to reduce
mortality from heat waves drastically, and also to prevent strong distribution
effects caused by a heat wave in an unadapted economy.
Chapter 4 focuses on the economic impact of floods and adaptation to them
in Switzerland. The main purposes of this chapter are as follows: (1) to better
understand the direct and indirect economic impacts of floods; (2) to analyze the
issue of efficient flood adaptation from a regionally diversified perspective; and
(3) to analyze the issue of financing adaptation in a federal system, where there is
an interplay between local and national governmental authorities in the provision
of local public good adaptations.
Chapter 4 has been developed within the context of the Sinergia project,
“Climate change extremes and adaptation strategies considering uncertainty and
federalism” (CCAdapt), which is financed by the Swiss National Fund. CCAdapt
intends to develop tools and methods that facilitate a more detailed charac-
terization of climate change adaptation from an economic and policy analysis
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perspective. We develop a theoretical framework for analyzing adaptation within
a federalist setting by taking an interdisciplinary approach which integrates
environmental economics, hydrology, meteorology and political sciences. In
a second step, this approach is taken for a Computable General Equilibrium
(CGE) analysis of Switzerland to evaluate feasible adaptation strategies. As
such, CCAdapt aims to deliver a refined theory of adaptation, improved tools for
quantifying adaptation strategies, and a better understanding of efficiency-equity
tradeoffs as well as political barriers to adaptation.
Our numerical thought experiments in chapter 44 are based on a dynamic,
spatially differentiated Ramsey type Computable General Equilibrium Model.
The basis is a regional Input-Output table for Switzerland; with regions that are
determined by exposure and vulnerability to floods and not identical with area
municipalities. We derive the regional Input-Output table by using the location
quotient-based interregional input-output (IRIOLQ) framework proposed by
Jahn (2015). Again, taking a CGE approach is important because it allows us to
observe indirect effects. The impact floods can have on economies goes beyond
the direct local effects when water is coming into contact with infrastructure,
buildings and other properties. Because of inter-linkages within and across
regional economies, a sequence of feedback reactions inside and outside the
flooded area can be set off, which typically last much longer than the flood itself.
While private adaptation is observed indirectly in our model via reactions to
price changes caused by floods, when adaptation has the features of a local public
good, it has to be modeled explicitly. There are two categories of governments:
a federal government on the one hand, and regional governments on the other.
The latter can be understood as a federation of local communities, which are
characterized by high, medium or low exposure to floods. They are not identical
to local authorities. Depending on the funding scenario, the local governments
levy taxes on land or output for financing flood adaptation measures. The federal
government collects taxes on output for financing governmental consumption,
adaptation measures and/or transfers to the regional governments for co-financing
adaptation measures. Additionally, we assume that adaptation measures which
4Chapter 4 is co-authored with Gunter Stephan.
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are implemented by regional governments are more effective in preventing damage
than those which are implemented by the national government. This difference in
effectiveness is because of information deficits. Another important characteristic
of adaptation is that costs for adaptation arise in the case of proactive adaptation,
before the adaptation measure is actually implemented. To implement direct
damage in our model, we take the damage function approach proposed by Carrera
et al. (2015). It takes the spatial extent and the duration of the damage into
account.
Our analysis yields three major findings: (1) General equilibrium effects that
are caused by flood damage in highly vulnerable regions also lead to considerable
welfare and GDP losses in regions of low vulnerability. (2) By providing the
local public good adaptation, it is, at low economic cost, possible to significantly
reduce negative impacts on welfare, GDP as well as the allocation of resources
between regions and sectors. Finally, (3) funding the local public good with a
regional land tax should be preferred over a national output tax, or a combination
of both, with transfers from the national to regional governments.
To conclude, this thesis has three self-contained chapters that contribute
to our understanding of direct, indirect, market and non-market impacts from
extreme climate events. Additionally, this thesis provides insights into efficient
strategies to finance the (local) public good adaption. The first part shows the
derivation of a damage function for heat waves that also accounts for fatalities.
The second part provides insights into general equilibrium impacts from heat
waves, and compares different strategies to finance adaptation to heat waves.
The third part analyzes direct and indirect impacts of floods and adaptation to
them in a spatially differentiated setting that accounts for the different decision
and funding levels in a federal system.
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Chapter 2
Empirical Derivation of a
Damage Function for Heat Waves
in Europe
2.1 Introduction
According to the 5th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), the atmospheric carbon concentration is expected to rise
further during the 21st century. This will not only lead to an increase in mean
temperatures and changes in the patterns of precipitation, but it also implies
that the frequency, intensity and duration of extreme weather events, and heat
waves in particular, will increase significantly in the future (IPCC, 2013; Perkins
et al., 2012). The IPCC defines a heat wave as a ”period of abnormally and
uncomfortably hot weather”, which is operationalized as multi-day heat extreme
with daily maximum temperatures above a high (usually the 90th) percentile
relative to a late 20th century reference period (Fischer and Scha¨r, 2010; IPCC,
2013; Perkins et al., 2012). The IPCC projections are based on climate models
that simulate the observed features of heat waves very well, indicating a high
reliability of the model based simulations (IPCC, 2013).
Figure 2.1 shows that based on such simulations Europe will be especially
affected by rising summer temperatures over the next decades. High-percentile
summer temperatures will increase faster than mean temperatures, and summer
warming will be more intense in Mediterranean regions as well as in Central and
Northern Europe (IPCC, 2013). Consequently, heat stress, which is defined as
the combined effect of high temperatures and humidity, is expected to increase in
Europe. This will generate human discomfort, morbidity and mortality (IPCC,
2014).
Overall, these projections do not come at a surprise. During the past 20 years
Europe has been the most heat wave affected region in the world, and since the
1960s, more than 80% of all extreme event excess deaths resulted from heat waves
(see figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: Projection of warmest daily temperatures under different scenarios
Source: IPCC (2013), Note: Simulation of the warmest daily temperature (Tmax) in
case of amitigation scenario (RCP2.6), a stabilization scenario (RCP4.5) and a scenario
with high greenhouse gas emissions (RCP8.5) for the period 2081-2100.
For adapting efficiently to heat waves, one has to strike for a balance between
costs and benefits. While it is relatively straightforward to calculate the costs of
an adaptation measure, the estimation of expected benefits (usually measured in
prevented damages) is substantially more demanding. This is especially true in
the case of heat waves. First, research on the effectiveness of adaptation measures
to heat waves is still in its early stages. Second, damages from heat waves are
to a large extent non-market damages and not directly appraisable in monetary
units. There are only a few attempts in the literature so far on the representation
of non-market damages in a damage function. However, a persuading empirical
method to estimate both market and non-market damages from heat waves is
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Extreme Event Frequency Fatalities Damage (in US$)
Drought 26 0 19‘217.31
Mass movement 45 3‘608 2‘663.8
Flood 351 7‘859 99‘024‘720
Heat wave 45 76‘705 12‘123‘050
Storm 352 6‘052 88‘407‘495
Source: EM-DAT (2016)
Table 2.1: Damages from extreme climate events in EU27 countries and
Switzerland between 1960 and 2013.
the basis to analyse, evaluate and compare different adaptation strategies to heat
waves in Europe.
In this paper, we estimate a non-market damage function for heat waves in
Europe following the approach in Mendelsohn and Saher (2011) and Nordhaus
(2010). The contribution of our paper is threefold: First, and in contrast to
the previous literature that predominantly relies on cross-sectional data, we use
longitudinal data because we deem it essential to account for time effects in the
model. Second, our analysis focuses on non-market damages and a monetary
assessment of heat wave caused fatalities. In health economics, different methods
on the valuation of a statistical life have been developed and they are often
used for policy analysis (e.g., Zweifel et al. (2009)). Third, we estimate an
exponential hurdle model that accounts for the specific properties of non-market
damages, which are zero in years with no heat wave and positive when a heat
wave occurs. The hurdle model separates the modelling of the zero damages and
the conditional-on-positives part, closely following the theoretical literature.
Using climate and mortality data for 27 European countries, our results
indicate that the probability of observing a heat wave is determined by the average
temperature, precipitation and temperature variability in ten 5-year intervals
from 1960 to 2009, which is consistent with earlier studies (e.g., Scha¨r et al.
(2004)). We do not find an association of the climate variables with non-market
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damages in the conditional-on-positives part, but there is indication that the
age ratio (the ratio of citizens older than 65 relative to those aged 15 − 64
and the population density are positively associated with damages. We do
not find evidence for an association of non-market damages with GDP or the
degree of urbanisation. The main implication of our study is that demographic
characteristics seem relatively more important for non-market damages from heat
waves than the economic factors, which supports the notion that adaptation
strategies should mainly be targeted at the vulnerable groups of the population.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 summarises
the empirical and theoretical literature on damage functions in climate economic
modelling. Section 2.3 presents the theoretical framework. Section 2.4 gives an
overview of the data. Section 2.5 describes the empirical model, and section 2.6
presents the results. Section 2.7 concludes the paper.
2.2 Literature Review
In the following we provide an overview of the different approaches on how
to quantify damages from extreme weather events. First, we discuss damage
functions that have typically been used to analyse adaptation in the Computable
General Equilibrium (CGE) and in the Integrated Assessment (IA) frameworks.
Second, we show how the existing literature econometrically derives damage
functions and briefly summarise the main results.
In general, the literature distinguishes between market and non-market
damages. Market damages can be evaluated in terms of standard accounting
systems. Non-market damages are impacts of climate change that cannot be
directly valued in monetary units, e.g., species losses or a reduction in human
well-being (Buob and Stephan, 2011). Damage functions are used to link the
predictions from climate models with potential changes in the economy. This
linkage requires an assumption on the functional form of the relationship between
climate variables and (non-) market damages and different suggestions for the
shape of the damage function have been made, with very different implications
regarding the economically efficient level of mitigation and adaptation (Warren
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et al., 2006).
There are three main objections to the damage functions that have been used
in the CGE and in the IA frameworks so far:
(1) Model parameter are often arbitrarily chosen, without satisfactory expla-
nation or justification (Ackerman et al., 2009; Stanton et al., 2009)
(2) Damage functions are assumed to be continuous (Stanton et al., 2009)
(3) Different impacts from climate change are merged in a single number
(Mu¨ller-Fu¨rstenberger and Wagner, 2007)
The first point relates to the fact that the majority of theoretical models use
damage functions of the following (or similar) form (Warren et al., 2006).
Dit = αΔT
β
it ∙GDPit (2.1)
Dit measures damages in region i at time t as a fraction of the gross domestic
product GDP and ΔT describes the change in average temperatures. The
parameter α and β are chosen in accordance to the assumptions made about
the form of the functional form of the relationship between temperature change
and damages. In the majority of the models, like MERGE 1, DICE and AD-
DICE 2 a quadratic damage function is used (Stanton et al., 2009; Nordhaus
and Boyer, 2003; De Bruin et al., 2009; Warren et al., 2006). Other approaches
include further climate variables that may influence damages, like precipitation
(Schenker and Stephan, 2012). They use an additive functional form and account
for the level of temperature already reached (Mendelsohn, 2000). The majority
of models do not account for non-market damages.
1MERGE: Model for Estimating the Regional and Global Effects of greenhouse gas reductions
combines a de-tailed energy-economy model with carbon and climate models. Regional damage
functions account for market and non-market damages separately. Both are quadratic in
temperature, and non-market damages also depend on regional income (Parson et al., 1997)
2DICE: Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy integrate[s] in an end-to-end fashion the
economics, carbon cycle, climate science, and impacts in a highly aggregated model that
allow[s] a weighing of the costs and benefits of taking steps to slow greenhouse warming.
The damage function is in the 2013 updated version of the form Ω(t) = ψ1T (t) + ψ2(T (t))2
(Nordhaus and Boyer, 2003). The AD-Dice model additionally accounts for adaptation but
applies the same damage function as the dice model (De Bruin et al., 2009).
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An exception is MERGE, which assumes an S-shaped relationship between
the willingness-to-pay to prevent non-market damages and per capita income
(Manne et al., 1995; Manne and Richels, 2005)
Large non-CGE models, for example FUND3 and PAGE4, use a more complete
representation of damages and differentiate between market and non-market
damages. PAGE uses the traditional damage function in equation 2.1 and derives
values between 1 and 3 for the parameter β using Monte Carlo analysis (Ortiz
and Markandya, 2009; Hope, 2006; Ackerman et al., 2009). FUND has a damage
module that is dynamic in climate and socio-economic vulnerability and accounts
for different durations of the damage memory. It measures damages in monetary
units as well as number of fatalities and is the first model that accounts for
different damages from different extreme events (Ortiz and Markandya, 2009;
Tol, 2002). Parameter in the model are chosen by a mixture of informed guess,
theoretical assumptions of experts, estimations and extrapolations events (Tol,
2002; Anthoff and Tol, 2013).
As an alternative to the calibration of parameter in a theoretical damage
function, econometric methods have been proposed to empirically infer a damage
function (Mendelsohn and Saher, 2011). Socio-economic variables that influence
damages from extreme weather events can be identified from data and the size
and direction of their impact can be estimated. Mendelsohn and Saher (2011)
use a least squares regression for time-averaged cross sectional data between
1960 and 2010 to project damages from different extreme weather events with
and without global climate change. Market damages and fatalities are used
as the dependent variables. Income, population density, mean and variance of
temperature and precipitation are used as the explanatory variables. Concerning
heat waves, Mendelsohn and Saher (2011) find that income, population density,
life expectancy and the variance in precipitation have a positive and significant
effect on market damages and fatalities.
3The FUND model uses the standard functional form of the damage function but differentiates
parameter by loss category and region.
4In the PAGE model, damage estimates correspond to a 2.5
◦
C increase in temperature, the
mean expected warming for a doubling of CO2. Impacts are computed for each region, sector,
and analysis period as a power function of regional temperature increase above the tolerable
level. An adaptive policy can mitigate these impacts.
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Nordhaus (2010) estimates damages from hurricanes in the United States. The
dependent variable, costs as share of GDP, is regressed on the maximum wind
speed, sea surface temperature and a time trend. Kellenberg and Mobarak (2008)
use panel data to show that the risk of disaster damages depends quadratically
on income. Dorland et al. (1999) aim to find the impact of climate change on
North-Western European storm damages in housing using the number of objects,
the postal code area and the storm speed as explanatory variables.
Most of the empirical studies look at market damages from extreme weather
events, but to the best of our knowledge, there is no derivation so far of a
non-market damage function that would evaluate heat wave caused fatalities in
monetary terms. This will be a main contribution of our study. We also add to
the literature by proposing a modelling framework that explicitly separates the
zero damages in regions and years without a heat wave from the positive non-
market damages in years with a heat wave. Since we do not expect the climate
variables and the socio-economic characteristics to have the same influence on
the two parts, we deem this a relevant methodological extension to the related
literature.
2.3 Theoretical Approach
A theoretical approach for assessing the damages from extreme weather events
needs to take into account three multiplicatively combined elements (Mendelsohn
and Saher, 2011):
(1) the probability πit that a heat wave occurs,
(2) the damage reducing adaptation function Ait, and
(3) the magnitude of the damages CDit, on the occurrence of a heat wave;
Dit = πit ∙ (1− Ait) ∙ CDit (2.2)
We assume that the probability πit at which a heat wave occurs in region i at time
t is determined by a set of climate variables. The modelling of the probability
has already been studied elsewhere, e.g., Scha¨r et al. (2004), and will not be a
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main focus of our analysis.
The adaptation function Ait accounts for the fact that the magnitude of
damages in case of a heat wave is reduced were adaptation measures implemented.
The adaptation function can take values between 0 (no damage preventing
adaptation) and 1 (complete adaptation, no residual damages). Ait is typically
assumed an increasing and concave function in the adaptation stock, which like
capital stock can be accumulated over time and describes any measure that can
prevent damages from heat waves (Bucher and Guelden Sterzl, 2011; De Bruin
et al., 2009).
The third variable, CDit, describes the damages conditional on the occurrence
of a heat wave as a function of climate variables and socio-economic factors that
determine the vulnerability, exposure and adaptation capacity of region at time.
In the existing theoretical literature (see Section 2.2), the functional form for the
impact of temperature and income on damages is often assumed quadratic, which
can be tested by means of an econometric model. The hypothesised impact of
the other determining variables is presented in Section 2.4.2.
Based on the theoretical framework, our empirical analysis aims at estimating
equation 2.2 by explicitly taking into account two of the above-mentioned
components. In a first step, we approximate the probability that a heat wave
occurs as a function of different climate variables. In a second step, we describe
the expected damages in the case of a heat wave as a function of climate variables,
socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the country. We are not
able to separate adaptation mechanisms from the estimation of the conditional
non-market damage function and therefore our results must be interpreted to
incorporate both.
2.4 Data and Descriptive Analysis
The data we use stem from different sources because no single data set is available
that would contain all the information needed for our analysis. The created panel
data cover 27 European countries plus Switzerland (EU27CH) except Malta,
which is too small to find reliable climate data over the ten 5-year time intervals
22
between 1960 and 2009.
2.4.1 Dependent Variables
As discussed above, there are two types of damages from heat waves to
differentiate: market and non-market damages. While market damages represent
a relatively small part of the overall damages from heat waves, the share of
fatalities is relatively high compared to other extreme events making non-market
damages particularly important (Alberini et al., 2006a). For this reason, we
consider fatalities and non-market damages as our main dependent variables:
Fatalities: This variable measures the number of excess deaths caused by heat
waves as count data in every 5-year interval. This information is provided by
CRED/EM-Dat.
Non-market Damages: This variable is a non-monotonic transformation of
fatalities. Excess deaths are weighted with an age adjusted Value of Statistical
Life (V SLit) measured in 1000 US$ in the 5-year periods. Own calculations
are based on studies that provide the V SL in different countries in Europe.
The detailed derivation of this variable is described below.This variable is a
transformation of the variable fatalities.
Measuring heat wave caused fatalities does not come without problems. The
number of deaths related to heat waves might be underreported because heat wave
is no official cause of death. Although the main health impacts from heat waves
are confirmed to be caused by cardiovascular and respiratory diseases (Kenney
et al., 2014; Analitis et al., 2014), time lags between emergence and admission
to hospital and problems in considering sudden death complicate the statistical
coverage of heat wave caused fatalities. Reported fatalities can be interpreted
as excess deaths caused by heat waves net of so called early harvest. They are
measured by using Poisson models to estimate the excess mortality compared
to a past average level during the respective period of time in the year. Net of
early harvest means to account for short-term mortality displacement. Monthly
deviations from predicted mortality are then cumulated from the heat wave event
onwards for some months to get an estimate of the number of heat wave caused
23
fatalities. If excess mortality had been caused by early harvest, cumulative excess
mortality would have decreased to zero very shortly after the heat wave.
Table 2.2 summarises fatalities and, for comparison reasons, market damages
from heat waves in the EU27CH countries since 1960. It can be observed that
some countries are more exposed and/or vulnerable to heat waves than others.
It should be noted that we do not consider morbidity as opposed to mortality
because there is no data set available that measures morbidity from heat stress
in a sufficient quality and comparability across countries.
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EU27CH countries Number of heat waves Fatalities Market Damages in ’000 $
Austria 5 357 280’000
Belgium 7 2’133 0
Bulgaria 9 76 50
Cyprus 0 0 0
Czech Republic 5 467 0
Denmark 0 0 0
Estonia 2 4 0
Finland 0 0 0
France 12 24’110 5’172’000
Germany 10 13’975 1’950’000
Greece 7 1’129 3’000
Hungary 5 662 0
Ireland 0 0 0
Italy 8 20’169 4532601
Latvia 4 86 0
Lithuania 5 87 0
Luxembourg 1 170 0
Netherlands 5 1’966 100’000
Poland 14 1’799 0
Portugal 4 2’737 0
Romania 18 516 0
Slovakia 5 128 150’000
Slovenia 1 289 80’000
Spain 8 15’616 1’804’300
Sweden 1 0 0
Switzerland 6 1’050 280’000
United Kingdom 7 319 47
Source: EM-DAT (2016)
Table 2.2: Damages from heat waves in EU27CH countries 1960 - 2013
We calculate non-market damages by evaluating every fatality caused by
a heat wave with the value of a statistical life (V SL) by country and time.
This approach has been proposed in a similar manner by Alberini et al. (2006b)
and Sgobbi and Carraro (2008) to calculate non-market damages from extreme
weather events and to quantify the benefits from adaptation. In a first step,
we reviewed the literature to find credible estimates of the VSL in the EU27CH
countries. Our main sources are Braathen et al. (2009); Baccini et al. (2008) and
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Miller (2000). Because there are different methods and contexts used to estimate
the VSL, we rely whenever possible on the willingness to pay approach reported
for environmental risks. We prioritise according to the age of the studies and
prefer actual results to older ones. For some countries only VSL estimates from
1995 or those that account for health and traffic risks are available, but we assume
that they serve as good approximations. For Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia,Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia there are no VSL data
available and thus the EU average reported by Miller (2000) is used. All damages
are adjusted to the base year 2005, corrected for inflation, and expressed in US$.
We calculate non-market damages from the fatality data by evaluating every
fatality caused by a heat wave with the value of a statistical life. This approach
has been proposed in a similar manner by Alberini et al. (2006b) and Sgobbi and
Carraro (2008) to calculate non-market damages from extreme weather events
and to quantify the benefits from adaptation. nt for health and traffic risks
are available, but we assume that they serve as a good approximation. For
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Romania, Slovakia
and Slovenia there are no data on the value of a statistical life available and thus
the EU average reported by Miller (2000) is used. All damages are adjusted to
the base year 2005, corrected for inflation, and expressed in US$.
To account for the dependence of the V SL on age and life expectancy, we
adjusted VSL by evaluating the remaining life years. In accordance with Alberini
et al. (2004) and Aldy and Viscusi (2008) and due to the lack of consistent
empirical results on the impact of age on the V SL (Schleiniger and Blo¨chliger,
2006), every life year has been valued identically. Thus, the number of remaining
years is used to adjust for age effects, but not for the willingness to pay in
different periods of life. The number of remaining life years is calculated as the
difference between the average life expectancy in a country and the age of 60, an
age threshold for those that suffer a higher risk from heat waves. This threshold
value is taken from earlier studies (Grizea et al., 2005; Michelozzi et al., 2005;
Baccini et al., 2008; WHO, 2009).
26
2.4.2 Explanatory Variables
The impact of specific extreme weather events on non-market damages in a region
is determined by the region’s exposition to the change in the climate system, its
sensitivity to climate change impacts and the capacity to adapt to it (Ebi and
Meehl, 2007). Any damage function must be able to display the vulnerability
of a region to extreme weather events, which we seek to achieve by including a
number of possible explanatory variables.
Climate Data
We use historical climate data on temperature and precipitation provided by the
ENSEMBLE project, which is supported by the European Commission. The data
used in this paper are the mean values of five different regional climate models.
Monthly data are averaged over 5-year intervals. We use the mean summer
temperature (June-July-August) at two meters measured in degrees Celsius, and
the mean summer precipitation measured in mm/day. The relationship between
health impacts and daily temperature in general is assumed to be quadratic; see
section 2.2 and WHO (2009); Pattenden et al. (2003); Michelozzi et al. (2007);
Reeves et al. (2010). We will test this assumption in the context of non-market
damages from European heat waves below. The impact of precipitation is not
clear in advance. On the one hand, higher precipitation may cool down the
atmosphere and reduce damages from heat waves. On the other hand, humidity
may increase heat stress and thus generate even stronger health impacts.
Several studies suggest that an increase in mean temperature accounts for
most of the changes in heat wave frequency. However, heat wave inten-
sity/amplitude is highly sensitive to changes in temperature variability and the
shape of the temperature distribution. Scha¨r et al. (2004); Beniston (2004)
and Katz and Brown (1992) conclude that it is not only the increased mean
temperature but also the increasing variance in temperatures that causes an
increase in the probability of heat waves. Scha¨r et al. (2004) find that a 50%
increase in the standard deviation of long-term summer temperatures increases
the probability of a 2003-like event by the factor of about 150. We follow these
studies and include standard deviations of summer temperature and precipitation
in the model for the occurrence of a heat wave, although it is not clear a priori
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whether the variability has a direct impact on non-market damages.
Socio-economic and demographic data
Socio-economic variables describe how vulnerable a region is to damages from
heat waves and how high the adaptation capacities are. If a vulnerable population
experienced heat waves in the past, then the awareness of the danger coming from
heat waves will be higher in general and adaptation measures are considered
more seriously (Reeves et al., 2010). This effect was observed for example after
the severe heat wave in 2003. The adaptation capacity, however, determines
the potential mitigation of future damages. We use the following socio-economic
variables to explain damages from heat waves in the past.
The impact of GDP on market and non-market damages can be positive
as well as negative. On the one hand, a higher GDP gives the potential for
higher market damages, because there are more consumption and capital goods
that are potentially destroyed. On the other hand, the higher the GDP is, the
higher may be the adaptation capacity (ECW, 1998). A relatively low number of
newly introduced early warning systems for heat waves in Europe (12 countries in
2011), the insufficient implementation of other measures and a relative high GDP
indicate that there is both a high adaptation capacity and potential in Europe
(Lowe et al., 2011). With regards to non-market damages, Mendelsohn and Saher
(2011) and Nordhaus (2010) find a positive effect of GDP on non-market damages
and fatalities. This means, the higher the GDP the more fatalities we face during
heat waves. This result may mainly be driven by the dependence of the VSL on
the GDP. However, a higher GDP may also be associated with a better health
care system and better medical care helps to reduce the number of heat wave
caused fatalities.
Due to the heat island effect, vulnerability to heat waves is usually strongly
increasing with the degree of urbanisation. Due to their infrastructure, architec-
ture and very small green areas, cities are heating up much faster and cooling
down much slower than rural areas. This is confirmed by the significantly higher
number of deaths in cities compared to rural areas (ECW, 1998; Michelozzi et al.,
2005; Ebi and Meehl, 2007; Baccini et al., 2008). Additionally, air pollution is an
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enforcing factor for the negative health effect of heat waves. Usually the degree of
air pollution is much higher in urban than in rural areas which adds to the heat
island effect (ECW, 1998; Lowe et al., 2011). The variable measuring the degree
of urbanisation is provided by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of
the United Nations and measures the share of people who live in urban regions.
From the above reasoning, we expect the effect of the degree of urbanisation on
damages from heat waves to be positive.
Data on the population density in the EU27CH countries are provided by
EUROSTAT. It is calculated as the average number of inhabitants of a country
per squared km. This variable is used as alternative proxy to account for the
heat island effect because it is closely related to (although not collinear with) the
degree of urbanisation. We expect that the vulnerability to heat waves increases
with the population density (WHO, 2009; Reeves et al., 2010).
The risk of suffering from negative health impacts from heat waves increases
with age. Older people on average are more strongly exposed to weather-related
threats due to their physical condition, an effect that may be aggravated by
special risk factors like the lack of selfsufficiency, living alone, suffering from pre-
existing diseases, deprivation and social isolation (WHO, 2009; Ebi and Meehl,
2007; ECW, 1998). The variable age ratio (in the demography literature also
known as dependency ratio) is intended to account for this impact. Table 2.3
summarises the mean values, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values
of all dependent variables and the explanatory variables included in our dataset.
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Mean SD Minimum Maximum
A. Outcomes
Fatalities 284 2’017 0 20’089
Non-market damages (1000 US$) 175’000 1’340’766 0 18’200’000
B. Determinants of the damage function
Temperature 17.41 3.81 10.71 27.51
Precipitation 2.48 0.77 0.06 4.53
Temperature SD 1.38 0.32 0.60 2.18
Precipitation SD. 0.45 0.16 0.04 0.97
GDP p.c. (in US$) 13’107 13’753 80 98’086
Age ratio in %(n65+/n15-64) 13.10 2.65 5.80 19.84
Degree of urbanization 0.65 0.14 0.28 0.97
Population density (n/km2) 120.41 91.58 14.70 482.58
Notes: N=270; 27 countries over ten 5-year intervals
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics
There are a several other explanatory variables that could have been included
in our analysis, including expenditures for the public health system, supply of
public health services and the ratio of overweight and obese people to normal
weight people. We tested those in our regressions, but they turned out to be
poor (small and statistically insignificant) predictors.
2.5 Empirical Methodology
An econometric model describing non-market damages from European heat waves
should closely follow the theoretical considerations in Section 2.3. In specifying
the empirical damage function, we need to acknowledge that there are two
possibly related statistical parts, one that describes whether there are positive
damages (equivalent to modelling the probability of the occurrence of a heat
wave), and another that describes the amount of damages conditional on the
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occurrence of a heat wave. Formally, this can be expressed as
Dit = 1(Hit = 1)×D∗it (2.3)
where observed damages Dit are either zero, or positive. The first term on the
right-hand side of 2.3 is an indicator function 1(Hit = 1), which equals one if a
heat wave Hit occurs in country i and year t, and equals zero in case of no heat
wave (and accordingly no damages). D∗it denotes the amount of damages when a
heat wave occurs, i.e. Dit = D
∗
it, if the indicator function 1(Hit = 1) equals one.
We assume a probit structure for the first part of the model, i.e., the probability
of Hit = 1 is modeled with a probit link function of different climate variables.
For the second part, i.e., damages D∗it , we specify the following exponential model
D∗it = exp(X
′
itβ + αi + γt + εit) (2.4)
where D∗it (fatalities or non-market damages) is expressed as a log-linear function
of a vector of explanatory variables Xit including climate variables, socio-
economic and demographic characteristics, country-specific heterogeneity αi, time
effects γt, and a time-varying error εit. The parameter vector β is the objective of
our analysis. It describes how the components in Xit are related to non-market
damages in the case a heat wave occurs. Parameter β can be interpreted as semi-
elasticities, i.e.,100% ∗ [exp(βjΔxj)−1] shows the relative change in damages D∗it
for a change in the jth regressor by Δxj . Due to the limited amount of data and
because we want to develop a prediction model for non-market damages from heat
waves, time effects γt are assumed linear (quadratic) in our model. Estimation
of β is carried out in a maximum likelihood framework under a random effects
assumption on the error components, i.e., we assume uncorrelated heterogeneity
αi and errors εit.
We conducted several tests on the statistical relationship between the two
parts of the model, with the one extreme being independence (exponential
hurdle model) and the other extreme being perfect statistical dependence (as in
traditional Tobit models); see Wooldridge (2010) for a discussion of these models.
We could reject the model with perfect statistical dependence against the hurdle
model and against a model that allows for a correlation between the two parts by
31
assuming random effects with joint normal distribution (referred to as exponential
type-II Tobit); Vuong-test p-value < 0.001. In the exponential type-II Tobit we
could not reject the null hypothesis of a zero correlation between the two parts,
and therefore we present the results for the exponential hurdle model only (Stata
14 command -churdle-).
2.6 Estimation Results
2.6.1 Descriptive Evidence
As a first step towards evaluating the impact of heat waves on fatalities and
non-market damages, we provide a refined set of descriptive statistics where we
distinguish between the country-year records where a heat wave occurred during
the study period (35 observations) and the country-year records where no heat
wave occurred (235 observations). Table 2.4 combined with Table 2.3 shows
the two parts in the number of fatalities: we observe zero fatalities in years
without heat wave and we observe on average almost 2,200 fatalities in years
when a heat wave occurred, with a standard deviation of 5,280. The number
of fatalities translates into non-market damages of 1.35 billion US$ on average.
We see a number of differences in the explanatory variables when comparing the
country-year records with and without a heat wave. In particular, the average
temperature and precipitation as well as temperature variability are higher in
years with a heat wave. We also observe a significantly higher GDP per capita, a
larger age ratio and a higher population density, indicating that different countries
experienced heat waves during the study period and that this heterogeneity needs
to be accounted for when modelling a non-market damage function.
2.6.2 Occurrence Equation
In a second step, we provide estimates for the first term in equation 2.3, namely
a probit model for the probability that a heat wave occurred during our study
period. The dependent variable in this model equals 1 for the country-year records
where a heat wave was observed, and equals zero otherwise.
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Years without heat wave Years with heat wave
Mean SD Mean SD
A. Outcomes
Fatalities 0 0 2’191 5’280
Non-market damages (1000 US$) 0 0 1’349’998 3’548’198
B. Determinants of the damage function
Average temperature 17.15 3.83 19.18 3.16
Average precipitation 2.42 0.81 2.89 0.03
Temperature SD 1.36 0.32 1.52 0.32
Precipitation SD. 0.45 0.16 0.44 0.15
GDP p.c. (in US$) 9’249 12’846 22’538 14’229
Age ratio (n65+/n15-64) 18 2.41 15.87 1.94
Degree of urbanization 0.65 0.14 0.28 0.97
Population density (n/km2) 115.30 87.86 154.75 108.76
Number of observations 235 35
Notes: 27 countries over ten 5-year intervals
Table 2.4: Mean values by occurrence of heat waves
As explanatory variables we use the climate variables (average temperature
and precipitation, temperature and precipitation variability in the 5-year inter-
vals) and a linear time trend. Here, and in the following regressions, we adjust
the standard errors for clustering at the country level because within-country
observations are likely dependent.
Table 2.5 displays the estimated coefficients of four different specifications of
the probit model. Column 1 shows the results for the climate variables excluding
the linear time trend, column 2 adds the linear time trend, and columns 3 and 4
restrict the sample to the years 1985 to 2010.
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Sample 1960-2010 Sample 1985-2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average temperature 1.518∗∗∗ 1.222∗∗∗ 1.034∗∗∗ 1.209∗∗
(0.414) (0.365) (0.283) (0.369)
Average temperature squared −0.0370∗∗∗ −0.0336∗∗∗ −0.0267∗∗∗ −0.0333∗∗
(0.0106) (0.0102) (0.00757) (0.0103)
Average precipitation 1.474∗∗ 0.772∗∗ 1.107∗∗ 0.772∗
(0.461) (0.249) (0.339) (0.361)
Temperature SD 0.518 2.807∗∗∗ 1.597∗ 2.820∗∗∗
(0.497) (0.837) (0.633) (0.841)
Precipitation SD −0.398 −0.941 0.149 −0.885
(0.952) (1.329) (1.117) (1.337)
Time trend (year) 0.153∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗
(0.0218) (0.0235)
Constant −20.57∗∗∗ −323.1∗∗∗ −15.69∗∗∗ −316.9∗∗∗
(5.124) (46.15) (3.438) (49.51)
Number of observations 270 270 135 135
Notes: The table shows the estimated coefficients of a probit model for the occurrence of a
heat wave in a 5-year interval using country-level data for 27 European countries over the
time frame stated at the top of the table. Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for serial
correlation within countries. Significance levels: ∗p < 0.05,∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗∗p < 0.001
Table 2.5: Probit results for occurrence of heat waves
The latter restriction is imposed to evaluate the sensitivity of results to the
choice of study period as Europe was affected by heat waves mainly from the
mid 1980s onwards. The results of the probit model indicate that average
temperature, average precipitation, and temperature variability are strongly
associated with the occurrence of heat waves, which is consistent with earlier
studies (e.g., Scha¨r et al. (2004). The results also indicate that the inclusion
of a linear trend has a significant impact on model predictions and gives more
stable results irrespective of the chosen time frame. The estimated coefficients
are interpreted best by translating them into average probability effects for the
occurrence of a heat wave. For precipitation we find that an increase by 0 .5
34
mm/day on average is associated with an increase in the probability of a heat wave
by approximately 3.5 percentage points. For the average summer temperature,
we find a significant inverse u-shaped relationship, which translates into predicted
probabilities as shown in Figure 2.2. Low mean summer temperatures (less than
13 degrees Celsius) are associated with a probability of a heat wave close to
zero, which goes up to approximately 30% for mean temperatures around 19
degrees Celsius, and then levels off. The results shown in Figure 2.2 are average
predictions, i.e., predicted probabilities are averaged over the particular climate
conditions in a given country and year.
Figure 2.2: Predicted probabilities for occurrence of heat wave by average
temperature
Notes: Predictions are calculated based on estimation results shown in Table 2.5
(column 1). 95%-confidence interval with standard errors adjusted for clustering at
the country level.
An increase in the standard deviation of summer temperatures by 0 .3 (which
is approximately one standard deviation in the summer temperature variability)
is associated with a 7.6 percentage points higher probability of observing a heat
wave. We do not find evidence for a significant association of the probability
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of a heat wave with the precipitation variability. We extended the probit
regressions of Table 2.5 by the socio-economic characteristics listed in Section
2.4.2 to test whether these variables are associated with the occurrence of heat
waves (results available upon request). None of the variables had a robust and
statistically significant relationship with the occurrence of heat waves in our two
longitudinal samples (1960-2009 and 1985-2009), indicating that some of the
previously found relationships might be due to neglected country heterogeneity
and/or underlying time trends (Mendelsohn and Saher, 2011). We also tested
for a quadratic relationship in the precipitation variable, but this turned out
statistically insignificant (p-value of the squared term 0 .832).
2.6.3 Conditional Damage Function
In a third step, we estimate the conditional non-market damage function using
the exponential hurdle model structure. We present the results separately for the
number of fatalities (Table 2.6) and for the monetary assessment of non-market
damages (Table 2.7).
Number of fatalities : We find a strong and significant relationship between the
age ratio and the population density and the number of fatalities (Table 2.6). For
the population density in the full model (column 5), an increase in the number of
inhabitants by 10 per squared kilometre (which is about one tenth of a standard
deviation) is associated with an increase in the number of fatalities by 7.8%. For
the age ratio, we find an inverse u-shaped relationship and thus the association
depends on the level of the age ratio. If evaluated at 15% (about the mean value
in the heat wave sample), then an increase by one percentage point is associated
with an increase in the number of fatalities by approximately 28%. We do not find
significant associations with the degree of urbanisation and GDP per capita. It
turns out that the latter two included alone in a model for the number of fatalities
are significantly and positively associated, but the associations are driven by
related demographic characteristics of the country, which would be consistent
with the positive impact of GDP found in Mendelsohn and Saher (2011).
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The baseline model (column 1) suggests an inverse u-shaped relationship
between average summer temperatures and the number of heat wave caused
fatalities, with a turning point at a temperature lower than the observed mini-
mum, which indicates a downward sloping function. However, the relationship
is very sensitive to the inclusion of socio-economic and demographic information
and it turns positive on average in the model with all characteristics included
(columns 5 and 6). The point estimates suggest that with each additional
degree in average summer temperatures the number of fatalities increases by
approximately 2.5%. Given that the within country standard deviation in average
summer temperatures is only about 0.3, this relationship is relatively weak and
statistically insignificant.
The results for the other climate variables suggest positive relationships
between the number of heat wave caused fatalities and average precipitation and
temperature variability, and a negative relationship with precipitation variability.
However, in all cases the relationships are weak and statistically insignificant (p-
values larger than 0.2). This result indicates that the climate variables relate to
the number of fatalities mainly through the occurrence equation, but not through
the conditional-on-positives part of the damage function.
Non-market damages: Overall, we confirm the results from the number of
fatalities for the amount of non-market damages (Table 2.7). The associations
between the population density and the age ratio with non-market damages are
slightly stronger (+9.3% for an increase in the number of inhabitants by 10, and
+39.9% for a one percentage point increase in the age ratio from 15% to 16%).
The association between GDP and non-market damages is stronger compared
to the equation for the number of fatalities, with an increase in GDP by 1%
associated with an increase by 0.9% in non-market damages (compared to 0.3%
for fatalities), but the association is not statistically significant (p-value = 0 .17).
As for the number of fatalities, we do not find evidence that the climate variables
are significantly related to non-market damages in the conditional-on-positives
part (p-values all larger than 0.4).
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2.6.4 Discussion of Results
We can draw three main conclusions from our results. First, we support the
findings of Scha¨r et al. (2004) who argue that climate variability, and temperature
variability in particular, has a stronger impact on the occurrence of heat waves
than the average summer temperatures and average precipitation in a country.
Second, European policy-makers continue to debate about the economic
impacts of demographic change. Our results indicate that the predicted growth
in the age ratio (the share of citizens aged 65 and older to citizens aged 15-65)
and rise in the population density in Europe will likely result in an increase in
heat wave induced fatalities and non-market damages if no adaptation measures
are initialized. Although insignificant once the population density and age ratio
are controlled for, the impact of the degree of urbanisation on the amount of
non-market damages from heat waves signals a potential starting point for such
measures. To this end, several studies support the idea that urban planning, e.g.,
planting of cities, planning of wind aisles and corridors and adapted building
constructions can reduce the urban heat island effect (e.g., Golden (2004);
Kleerekoper et al. (2012)).
The third conclusion relates to our statistical methodology and the estimation
of a non-market damage function for heat waves. General problems to consider
are the special characteristics of the dependent variable(s) and the low number
of observations that hamper the econometric derivation of a damage function.
We tackle these problems in two ways while keeping the ideas of earlier studies
(Mendelsohn and Saher (2011); Nordhaus (2010)). First, we aggregate climate
and mortality data and the socio-economic and demographic characteristics by
country over ten 5-year intervals from 1960 to 2009. The resulting longitudinal
data offer more variation and a bigger sample size while retaining the ideas of
the impact of climate change. Second, earlier studies have not attempted to
disentangle the damage function into two parts, one explaining the occurrence
of heat waves and the other explaining the conditional non-market damages
(conditional on positive damages). The exponential hurdle model suggested
here thus provides a refined set of estimates on the determinants of heat wave
caused fatalities. In particular, our results indicate an asymmetry with the
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climate variables more relevant at the extensive margin (for the occurrence of
heat waves), and the socio-demographic variables more relevant at the intensive
margin (positive non-market damages).
We also estimated the non-market damage function with a random effects
Poisson model, which does not make the distinction between zero and non-zero
damages. This model gave results very similar to Mendelsohn and Saher (2011).
However, we deem it essential for a better understanding of the underlying
mechanisms to use a more flexible statistical model as it is not clear a priori
whether the different determinants of heat wave caused fatalities, and non-market
damages from extreme weather events more generally, are equally relevant in all
parts of the outcome distribution. We selected a parametric exponential hurdle
model due to the (still) relatively small sample size, which makes it difficult to fit
semi- or non-parametric alternatives (like quantile or distributional regressions).
2.7 Conclusion
Damage functions provide an important tool for policy-makers i) to assess the
impacts of extreme weather events, and ii) to evaluate the expected benefits of
adaptation measures to climate change. In this paper, we estimate a function
for non-market damages from heat waves in Europe. Non-market damages are
calculated from heat wave caused fatalities using the value of statistical life
approach, and we suggest a novel econometric approach to the derivation of the
non-market damage function based on an exponential hurdle model.
In a related paper, Mendelsohn and Saher (2011) employ a worldwide data set
to estimate a damage function for a variety of extreme weather events. Compared
to their study, we confine ourselves to data from 27 European countries and non-
market damages from heat waves. This restriction is imposed for several reasons.
First, for the use of longitudinal data, we need reliable information over a long
time frame (from 1960 to 2009), which might be less critical in developed countries
with their longer history of data reporting in the areas relevant to our study
(climate and mortality data, socio-economic and demographic characteristics).
Second, we focus in our analysis on heat wave caused fatalities and non-market
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damages, which is a topic of major importance for the European countries given
the recent projections of the IPCC (IPCC, 2013, 2014). Third, non-market
damages are derived from the fatalities using the value of statistical life approach,
where again more reliable information is available for the developed countries,
and Europe in particular. On the downside, our results need to be interpreted as
evidence for the narrower set of European countries.
To conclude, our study provides a first attempt to estimate a non-market
damage function for heat waves in Europe using a monetary assessment of heat
wave caused fatalities. This and the estimation of an exponential hurdle model
provide new evidence regarding the economic impacts of climate change. In
particular, we find that the population density and the age ratio are positively
associated with non-market damages, whereas the climate variables, GDP and the
degree of urbanisation are insignificant in the conditional damage function. We
see our paper as complementary to Mendelsohn and Saher (2011) and Nordhaus
(2010). We add to the literature by suggesting a statistical approach that helps to
better understand the underlying mechanisms of the impact of climate variables
and socio-economic characteristics of a country on (non-) market damages from
extreme weather events. We also support the idea of this literature that any
assumption on functional form and/or model parameter of a theoretical damage
function should be rigorously tested with data that stem from different contexts
(extreme weather events) and different regions in the world.
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Chapter 3
Do We Need to Adapt to Heat
Waves? A General Equilibrium
Analysis for Switzerland
3.1 Introduction
According to the fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), the atmospheric carbon concentration is expected to
rise further during the 21st century. This will not only lead to an increase of mean
temperature and changes in the patterns of precipitation, but it also implies that
the frequency, the intensity and the duration of extreme events such as heat waves
will increase significantly (e.g. IPCC (2014)). Heat waves are usually understood
as “period(s) of abnormally and uncomfortably hot weather”. This is not a very
precise definition. However, even today, an exact and unique definition is missing,
as is shown in the IPCC reports, where heat waves are identified as multi-day heat
extremes relative to daily maximum temperatures above a high (usually 90th)
percentile relative to a late-20th century reference period (for further clarification,
see Fischer and Scha¨r (2010); Perkins et al. (2012)).
Climate models are very good at reproducing heat waves that have been
observed in the past. This indicates high reliability of model-based simulations,
which project that the frequency, the duration, the intensity and the spatial
extension of heat waves will significantly change in the near future. Europe
will especially be affected by rising summer temperatures. As model simulations
forecast, in Europe high-percentile summer temperatures will rise faster than
mean temperatures, and summer warming will be more intense in Mediterranean
regions as well as Central and Northern Europe. Consequently, heat stress, which
is defined as the combined effect of high temperature and humidity, is expected
to increase in Europe. This will generate additional discomfort; morbidity and
mortality (IPCC, 2014).
Overall, these projections are not surprising. In the last twenty years, Europe
has been the most heat wave affected region in the world. No other natural
catastrophe in the modern age has caused as many excess deaths in Europe as
heat waves. Since the early 1960’s more than 80% of all extreme events excess
deaths in Europe have been the result of heat waves. The 2003 heat wave in
Switzerland caused an estimated number of 975 fatalities and market damage 1
of about US$ 280 million (EM-DAT, 2016; Grizea et al., 2005). This is one of
the reasons that heat stress (triggered by climate change, which is expected to
increase significantly over the coming decades) has received public attention.
Mitigation of greenhouse gases is the most important policy response to the
threat of global warming. However, due to the inertia of the climate system,
climate change is unavoidable to some degree, even if greenhouse gas emissions
are reduced radically. This, and the lack of progress in the negotiations of a
successor of the Kyoto Protocol, has turned attention towards measures which
can be implemented on a national or regional scale with sufficient speed and
scope, and which allow for moderating the negative effects of climate change as
well as for reducing the climate vulnerability of communities and regions. Indeed,
optimal climate change strategies require a combination of both mitigation
and adaptation strategies (Buob and Stephan, 2011). Without investing in
appropriate adaptation measures, damage caused by heat waves will significantly
increase.
For adapting efficiently, one has to strike a balance between costs and benefits.
1Market damage are damage, which can directly be expressed in monetary units. For example,
in case of agriculture harvesting losses can directly be evaluated at market prices. In contrast,
non-market damage are damage, which cannot be directly expressed in units of a national
accounting system. Typical examples are species losses or health effects.
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This means benefits of adaptation, which are measured in terms of damage
prevented, have to match the costs of adaptation measures (Mendelsohn, 2000).
While costs are relatively well known, there is a lack of information about the
benefits. The majority of heat wave impacts are non-market damage. For
example, the decrease in quality of life caused by heat stress or the increase
in heat induced morbidity and mortality. Because these damage are difficult
to express in monetary units, the existing literature typically reports only the
numbers of fatalities or rates of additional (excess) mortality and morbidity
(Mendelsohn and Saher, 2011; Grizea et al., 2005). However, heat waves do
not only cause excess death. Heat waves can affect the labor supply and might
reduce the demand for consumption and leisure. In other words, heat waves
affect the societies’ productivity and influence the labor-leisure decision, hence
affecting both the allocation of resources and the distribution of income. As such,
a sole focus on excess death implies that general equilibrium effects of heat waves
are systematically neglected, however, important in designing efficient adaptation
strategies.
Taking general equilibrium effects of heat waves into account is furthermore
important for two reasons. First, at least to the extent that adaptation has the
property of a local public good, there might be spill-over effects and those who
benefit from adaptation must not be identical to those who bear the costs of
adaptation.
Second, people are not uniformly hit by heat waves. As the impact literature
tells (Haines et al., 2006; Johnson et al., 2005), heat wave impacts depend on at
least three factors: (1) the age, (2) the income, and (3) degree of urbanization
of the residence region of affected individuals. Very young and very old people,
as well as those with preexisting diseases, are suffering most during heat waves.
Poor people have less means for self-protection than the wealthy. The so-called
heat-island effect, which characterizes regions with a high degree of urbanization,
implies that townspeople are more affected by heat waves than people, who live
in rural areas. Because of their infrastructure, architecture and very small green
areas, cities are heating up much faster and cooling down much slower. Therefore,
the number of excess deaths from heat waves is significantly higher in cities than
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in rural areas (Baccini et al., 2008).
This paper deals with two principal research questions: (1) What is the
magnitude of general equilibrium impacts of a 2003-like heat wave on the Swiss
economy? (2) If adaptation to heat waves has the characteristic of a public good,
what are the diverse economic effects of different policies for financially funding
optimal adaptation to heat waves? Analyzing general equilibrium effects of heat
waves, in particular, requires analyzing the secondary effects that are initially
caused by direct impacts of heat waves. The direct impact is the increase in excess
mortality, which then results in changes in the economic system. Parameter,
which allow determining these direct impacts, are drawn from an analysis of
Grizea et al. (2005) on heat wave excess mortality2 (HWEM) during the 2003
heat wave in Switzerland and adjusted to our needs. Using these data, we are
able to determine both the direct and indirect effects a 2003 like heat wave event
would have if it shocks the Swiss economy in 2020.3
Note that we are not aiming for an integrated assessment analysis of heat
waves, which takes all complex interactions between economics activities, global
climate change and heat waves systematically into account. Instead, we are
running a policy evaluation analysis, where heat waves are taken as given
and where the effect of policy driven adaptation to heat waves in Switzerland
is analyzed. Some adaptation has the features of a private good and is
in the self-interest of economic agents, hence is automatically done. Some
adaptation, however, has the properties of a local public good and requires
governmental intervention. Typical examples are the increase of green areas in
cities, governmental campaigns to increase the awareness for the risk of morbidity
and mortality or the extension of resistance of public infrastructure like schools,
to heat waves. Therefore, an important second aim of this analysis is to compare
the economic effects of different policies for financially funding adaptation.
2”[Heat wave excess mortality is the] mortality above what would be expected based on the
non-crisis mortality rate in the population of interest. Excess mortality is thus mortality that
is attributable to the crisis conditions. It can be expressed as a rate (the difference between
observed and non-crisis mortality rates) [. . . ]”(Checchi and Roberts, 2005)
3This procedure is motivated by the findings of Beniston (2004) who argues that it is highly
reasonable to assume that because of climate change, future summers will show 2003 like heat
wave events.
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To that end, a computable general equilibrium model is developed which
allows us to distinguish between different economic agents according to the three
afore mentioned characteristics: age, income, urban form. Some might argue
that the most natural way of introducing a somewhat realistic age structure
into general economic analysis would be to use some variant of the Auerbach-
Kotlikoff overlapping generations (OLG) model. However, any variant of the
standard Auerbach-Kotlikoff model requires assuming that agents are clairvoyant
(Rasmussen and Rutherford, 2004). This assumption contradicts the analysis of
low probability, high impact events like heat waves. To avoid this problem and
to keep the model deliberately simple, a static Computable General Equilibrium
(CGE) model is developed that can be understood as a zoom into one single
period of a standard Auerbach-Kotlikoff model.
Overall, our results show that (1) heat waves might cause a high number of
fatalities combined with negative welfare and distribution effect, (2) governmental
provision of an optimal adaptation stock can reduce heat wave excess mortality
at the expense of a relatively low labor (0.4%), capital (0.5%) or consumption
(0.2%) tax.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the
model framework upon which the simulations are based. Section 3.3 discusses
the data and the calibration process. Section 3.4 discusses the results of a
comparative static analysis as well as the sensitivity analysis. Section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 The Modeling Approach
The following analysis is based on a static Computable General Equilibrium
(CGE) model.It combines a stylized description of production, governmental
activities and labor-leisure choice with a detailed characterization of heat wave
vulnerability of households, where direct impacts of heat waves are modeled in
terms of excess mortality. As mentioned above, this heat wave induced effect
depends on at least two factors: (1) the age structure of a society and (2) the
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degree of urbanization. Additionally, the households’ labor-leisure decision is
strongly influenced by its income. Therefore, the demand side of the economy is
disaggregated into 14 different age-cohorts (generations), where each generation
is further split into sub-cohorts according to income and degree of urbanization at
the place of residence. In other words, any household is a member of a sub-cohort
{a, h, t}, where a denotes age, h income and t the urban form, which could be
either rural (r) , suburban (s) or urban (u).
Impacts of heat waves can be moderated through investing into adaptation.
Some adaptation measures are private and investing in these measures is the self-
interest of agents. However, many measures for reducing excess mortality caused
by heat waves, have the feature of a (local) public good, like urban planning
measures or governmental campaigns to increase the awareness for the risk of
morbidity and mortality. In such cases providing optimal adaptation requires
policy interventions and is in the center of interest of this analysis. Note that there
are three homogenous commodities only, which are traded on perfect markets:
labor, tangible capital and a composite commodity, which is produced and can be
used for consumption by private households and/or for investing into adaptation.
3.2.1 Households
Let Na,h,t be the size of cohort {a, h, t} relative to the total of all cohorts.
Households of a particular cohort {a, h, t} are viewed as identical and each cohort
{a, h, t} behaves as if it were represented by a single agent, who maximizes the
cohort’s utility.
Na,h,tua,h,t(ca,h,t, `a,h,t) = Na,h,t
[
ϕh(ca,h,t)
σc`h + (1− ϕh)(`a,h,t)σc`h
] 1
σc`
h (3.1)
subject to the budget constraint of cohort {a, h, t} (see 3.2 below). ua,h,t is the
utility function of the representative agent of cohort {a, h, t} and depends on per
capita consumption ca,h,t of produced commodities as well as per capita leisure
`a,h,t. σ
c
hl defines the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure,
ϕh is the consumption share parameter. We assume that both, ϕh and σ
cl
h only
depend on the income of the cohort. The reasoning behind this assumption is:
(1) there is no evidence that the urban form has an impact on either parameter,
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(2) for Switzerland, or at least Europe, no empirical data on the impact of age
exist.
Any member of cohort {a, h, t} can earn income from two sources: (1) income
from selling the individual capital endowment ka,h,t, and (2) labor income. The
latter is generated through selling the share la,h,t = ωa,h,t−`a,h,t of the individual’s
total labor endowment ωa,t,h, which is measured in efficiency units (see Section
3.3 below) minus leisure `a,h,t.
As mentioned above, heat wave adaption can have the properties of a public
good. For financing the investment into adaptation measures, the government
can, among other things, levy taxes either on capital income, labor income or
consumption expenditure. Taking this into account, the budget constraint of
cohort {a, h, t} is given by
Na,h,tp
C(1 + τ c)ca,h,t ≤ Na,h,t
[
pL(1− τ l)(la,h,t) + pK(1− τ k)ka,h,t
]
. (3.2)
px, x ∈ {c, l, k} denotes the price of the consumption good, the wage rate and
the capital interest rate, respectively. τ z, z ∈ {c, l, k} identifies the tax on per
capita consumption c, labor income l and capital income k, respectively.
3.2.2 Production
To keep the model as simple as possible, the supply side is highly aggregated.
Suppose there is a single production sector, which produces a single, composite
output. Inputs into production are capital and labor, which are viewed as
homogenous across all cohorts. Suppose further that there is perfect competition
on all markets and that gross production Y is characterized by constant elasticity
of substitution (CES), i.e.
Y =
[
βY Lε + (1− βY )Kε] 1ε . (3.3)
K =
∑
a,h,t Na,h,tka,h,t and L =
∑
a,h,t Na,h,t (ωa,h,t − `a,h,t) denote the aggregated
physical capital and labor inputs, respectively. 1/(1 − ε) is the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor and βY is a share parameter of inputs.
55
3.2.3 Damage and Adaptation
Damage
As was mentioned above, heat waves affect economies in different ways. There
are direct impacts and there are general equilibrium effects, which result from the
economies’ response to direct impacts. Typical examples of direct impacts are
damage to the infrastructure, losses in agriculture production due to heat stress
or shortage in water supply during periods of heat and drought. These will be
called market damage, since they can directly be expressed in monetary units.
On the other hand, there are non-market damage such as heat wave induced
fatalities, since no prices exist for such kinds of effects.
Excess fatalities are by far the most severe direct impacts of heat waves. In
Europe, between 1960 and 2013, 80% of all fatalities that were caused by extreme
weather events are caused by heat waves, while only 6% of all market damage that
are caused by extreme weather events resulted from them (EM-DAT, 2016). This
motivates us to focus the analysis on excess mortality. Therefore, let Πa,h,t denote
the heat-wave-induced excess mortality rate, which is taken as exogenously given.
I.e., Πa,h,t represents the percentage of excess mortality in cohort {a, h, t} due to
heat waves.
Indirect impacts, which are called general equilibrium effects in the following,
result from the economies’ response to heat-wave-induced excess mortality. These
general equilibrium effects can be summarized as follows: The consumption of
goods and leisure, as well as the factor supply of capital and labor of agents,
who fall victim to a heat wave, is reduced to zero. However, the diverse nature
of factor supplies causes an important difference in the impact on production.
While the labor supply of heat wave fatalities vanishes entirely, the aggregat
capital stock is fixed in the short run. Resulting changes in factor and output
prices also induce changes in the factor supply and consumption, as well as leisure
demand of surviving cohorts.
Adaptation
Impacts of heat waves can be moderated through investing into adaptation.
Typical examples of adaptation to heat waves are urban planning, which aims at
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reducing the heat island effect in urban and suburban areas through increasing
the share of green areas and maintaining wind aisles; governmental campaigns to
increase the awareness for the risk of morbidity and mortality through heat waves,
and investment into early warning systems. This shows that adaptation covers
a wide range of heterogeneous measures, which, according to Smit et al. (1999),
can be classified according to attributes such as timing, temporal and spatial
scope. What the three aforementioned examples have in common is that they fall,
with respect to timing, into the category of proactive or anticipatory adaptation
because they require investing into protection infrastructure and stocks. On the
other hand, there are reactive measures through which climate impacts can be
moderated almost instantly, like for example to increase nursing staff in hospital
and residential care homes for elderly; the provision of water and shaded areas at
public places; securing the energy supply of cooling dependent power stations for
public and private cooling and transport facilities. (Bosello et al., 2009; De Bruin
et al., 2009). Because of the static character of our analysis, we limit ourselves
to reactive adaptation. What these measures have in common is that they have
the properties of a local public good, so their spatial scope is regional not national.
Let the effect which investing into adaptation has on heat wave excess
mortality, be expressed by the adaptation function Ψ(AS), where, similar
to Schenker and Stephan (2012), AS denotes the expenditure for adaptation
measures. Ψ(AS) determines by how much the excess mortality can be reduced
depending on the available adaptation expenditure. The direct impact of heat
waves on mortality is given by Πa,t. This parameter measures the number of
additional, heat-wave-caused fatalities in percentage. However, the heat wave
induced excess mortality can be moderated by adaptation. Hence Ma,h,t, which
represents the relative size of cohort {a, h, t} that survives the heat waves, is
given by
Ma,h,t = Na,h,t [1− Πa,h,tΨ(AS)] . (3.4)
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Condition 3.4 implies that the higher the excess mortality caused by a heat
wave, and the lower the effect of adaptation measures in preventing fatalities,
the lower is the fraction of a sub-cohort that survives a heat wave. Furthermore,
let the effect investing into adaptation has on heat wave excess mortality be
characterized by decreasing marginal benefits of adaptation expenditure AS, i.e.,
Ψ(AS) = e−ψAS , (3.5)
where ψ is the efficiency parameter of adaptation, i.e., the higher ψ, the more
effective are the adaptation expenditures.
Finally, let us assume that the government aims for a first best solution in
the sense that the optimal level of adaptation is derived from maximizing social
welfare. Social welfare is defined as the sum over cohorts of individual utility
weighted by the cohorts share in total population, i.e.
W (AS, ua,h,t) =
∑
a,h,t
Na,h,t [1− Πa,h,tΨ(AS)] ua,h,t (3.6)
In order to finance the optimal level of adaptation, the government can, as
indicated in condition 3.2, levy taxes on consumption expenditure, labor or
capital income of households. Another possible way to finance adaptation is
to levy an inheritance tax τ Inh on capital that is released by heat wave victims
and bequeathed to heat wave survivors. In this case the inheritance tax revenue
R used to finance the adaption stock AS is
R = τ Inh
∑
a,h,t
Na,h,tΠa,h,tΨ(AS)ka,h,t (3.7)
Because we assume the government’s budget to be balanced, the tax rates to
finance the adaptation expenditure are determined endogenously.
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3.3 Data and Calibration
3.3.1 Social Accounting Matrix and Key Parameter of the
Model
For analyzing the effects of a heat wave on the Swiss economy numerically,
we specify several numerical inputs. This includes a Social Accounting Matrix
(SAM) on the one hand and parameter of the theoretical model on the other.
Through merging the 2008 Swiss Input-Output Table (IOT) (BFS, 2009) with
an aggregation of the Swiss Household Budget Survey (HABE) for the time span
of 2006 to 2008 (BFS, 2016) we created a stylized Swiss Social Accounting Matrix
(SAM) in four steps: First, we adjusted the existing symmetric IOT such that
it fits the structure of the model economy with one macro production sector and
a highly disaggregated household sector (see Section 3.2). Second, we use the
HABE data to compute for every cohort per capita labor as well as per capita
capital income. Third, we use data on the average net income on community level
(BFS, 2012) to determine the number of individuals per cohort {a, h, t}. Fourth
and finally, we use the results of steps two and three to compute the shares of
any cohort {a, h, t} in the total of both labor and capital income. The resulting
SAM is presented in appendix 3.A.
Among the model parameter, which have to be specified numerically, the
most important ones are: (1) structure of the Swiss population with respect to
age, income and regions, (2) labor endowment of cohorts and (3) direct impacts
(damage) of a 2003-like heat wave.
Structure of the Swiss population by age and region
2010 data on the population shares Na,h,t are provided by the Stat-tab database
of the regional population distribution in Switzerland (BFS, 2010). In our view,
these data give a good approximation of the population structure in 2008. By
neglecting differences in the distribution of income, Figure 3.1 represents the
relative size of cohorts depending on the age group {20− 24, 25− 29, ..., 85− 90}
and the location of residence, which can be urban {u}, suburban {s} or rural {r}.
c
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Figure 3.1: 2010 Swiss population shares by age and region
Source: BFS (2015a)
Labor endowment by age, region and income group
As was mentioned above, the time endowment ωa,h,t of cohort {a, h, t} is measured
in efficiency units and hence depends on the productivity of labor. I.e., if the
labor endowment is measured in efficiency units, any increase of productivity has
the same effects as if more labor were effectively available. Labor productivity in
turn depends on several factors of which age and income are the most important.
A standard approach in the literature (see for example Rasmussen and Rutherford
(2004); Rausch (2009)) is to assume that the labor productivity is hump shaped,
such that productivity is positively correlated to income but negatively to age.
Note that the urban form has by assumption no impact on labor productivity.
Equation 3.8 reflects these assumptions.
ωa,h = ζ
scale
h
e4.47+ζ
age
h ∙a−ζage2h ∙ a2
e4.47
(3.8)
If measured in efficiency units, labor supply will decrease with age and increase
with income, if the parameter ζscaleh , ζ
age
h and ζ
age2
h are chosen as in Table 3.1.
Thus, households retire if their labor productivity is low enough that the value
of leisure is higher than the income from labor. Additionally, Table 3.1 shows
the income dependent consumption share parameter ϕh and the elasticity of
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substitution between consumption and leisure σclh : The higher the household’s
income is, the higher is its elasticity of substitution between consumption and
leisure and its consumption share in the utility function.
Income quantile σclh ϕh ζ
scale
h ζ
age
h ζ
age2
h
1 1.05 0.575 0.80 0.0700 0.0028
2 1.10 0.625 0.85 0.0725 0.0026
3 1.15 0.650 0.90 0.0750 0.0024
4 1.20 0.650 0.95 0.0775 0.0022
5 1.25 0.675 1.00 0.0800 0.0020
Table 3.1: Parameter specification
Damage Parameter
Remember, we intend to analyze the general equilibrium effects that a 2003 like
heat wave can have on the Swiss economy. Remember further that Πa,h,t is the
heat-wave-induced excess mortality rate in case that a 2003 like heat wave hits
Switzerland. Theoretically, the heat-wave-induced excess mortality rate depends
on age, income and the residence region of the affected household (see Section
3.2). However, because we have no data that show how heat wave excess mortality
depends on income in Switzerland (or even Europe), we are not differentiating
the heat wave excess mortality rate with respect to income.
In the following, let Πa,t denote the modified heat wave mortality rate. For
estimating Πa,t we use the results of Grizea et al. (2005). Based on daily data on
all-cause mortality and a Poisson approach, Grizea et al. (2005) estimate the heat-
wave-induced excess mortality in Switzerland for June to August 2003 depending
on age and urban form independently of each other. However, as our modeling
approach requires information on the expected excess mortality of a 2003-like
heat wave event conditional on age and urban form, we have to merge the both
separate results of Grizea et al. (2005). Therefore, we compiled optimistic and
pessimistic values for the parameter Πa,t based on their estimates and 95% -
confidence intervals.
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The first part of Table 3.2 shows the results of Grizea et al. (2005). In the
first column we find the regional and age subgroups, in the second column we
find the number of estimated heat wave excess death. The third column reports
the heat wave induced increase in mortality in percentage. Column four and
five present the significance of these results with the 95% confidence interval and
the p-values. The second part of Table 3.2 summarizes the results of our data
derivation for Πa,t by age and region.
While the estimated excess deaths are, as expected, higher the older the age
group, the regionally diversified results attract attention because the number
of excess death is higher in suburban compared to urban regions. This result
is because of the heat island effect, counterintuitive, but not discussed in Grizea
et al. (2005). We assume that it is caused by the very high number of communities
that has been classified by the BFS in 2000 as suburban regions although they
have a strong urban character. The old definition principles have been based on
the total number of inhabitants of a community and did not take the population
density into account. This procedure has been improved by the BFS in 2014
(Forster, 2014) but our data base still depends on the old definition.
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Inheritance
Although we cannot identify the offspring of heat wave victims directly, there
are three possibilities to represent the redistribution of capital that is released
by heat wave victims to inheritors. The first one is to distribute the released
capital stock according to the initial distribution of capital in the generations who
inherit capital. The second possibility is a per capita distribution that accounts
for the size of the succeeding cohort. The third and favored option makes two
assumptions to identify the cohorts who profit from inheritance. (1) Capital is
bequeathed to age cohorts according to the probable age of the inheritor. (2)
The initial distribution of capital, with respect to income and residence region, is
kept. Implementing the first assumption, we use data on the age at parenthood
in Switzerland in 2010 to derive the probable age of the offspring of heat wave
victims. Table 3.3 shows the number and share of Swiss citizens who became
parents at a certain age. As we know how many Swiss citizens became parents at
a certain age, we also know what the age of the offspring of these citizens is when
they die. For example, because 34% of all Swiss citizens became parents between
30 and 34, we assume that heat wave victims between 70 and 74 bequeath their
capital endowment with a probability of 34% to cohorts of age 40 − 44. Thus,
the probability to start parenthood at a certain age determines the distribution
of the inheritance to inheritor cohorts by age.
20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Parenthood at age of 9644 32631 54474 41309 15565 3815 998
share 0.06 0.21 0.34 0.26 0.1 0.02 0.01
Source: BFS (2014b)
Table 3.3: Parenthood (Number of persons having their first child by age group)
of mother and father in Switzerland in 2010
3.3.2 Calibration
Because of the stylized character of the model, we apply the naive calibration
approach that is similar to the one proposed by Rasmussen and Rutherford
(2004). This procedure has the advantage of being independent of the production
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side of the economy. Nevertheless, it ensures consistency between the households
individual optimization problem and the aggregated economy (described by the
social accounting matrix) by introducing an endogenous scaling factor for the
total labor endowment, ω. In our approach, however, the retirement decision
is endogenous and depends especially on parameter values for σc`h , ϕh, ζ
scale
h , ζ
age
h
and ζage2h (see Table 3.1). Therefore, the results of the calibration process, the
cohort individual labor endowment in efficiency units as well as the labor-leisure
decision of the households are the main results of the calibration process.
Calibration Results
The solution to the cohorts optimization problem depends on the productivity
profile, the consumption share, and the substitution elasticity. Because these
parameter are differentiated by age and income, we also find cohort dependent
solutions to the optimization problem. As Figure 3.2 shows, the households
labor productivity decreases with age. Additionally, high income cohorts are
characterized by higher labor productivity. These characteristics are independent
of the territorial region of the household. With the applied parameterization, the
predominant share of cohorts retires at the age of 65, which is the official Swiss
retirement age.
Figure 3.2 presents the cohorts labor-leisure decision. Cohorts younger than
50 spend slightly more than 60% of their total time endowment for working.
This value decreases to about 30% for cohorts who are 50 to 64. The majority of
cohorts of age 65 are retired. The labor-leisure decision also mirrors the income
structure of households of different age. Figure 3.2 presents the age dependent
income composition of cohorts using the example of {h = 2, t = s}. Because of
the high labor productivity at the age of 20 − 29 (see Figure 3.2), households
generate their income at this age exclusively from labor. Between the age of 30
and 64, the share of capital in total income increases to slightly more than 30%.
Retired cohorts of age 65 and older generate their whole income from capital.
65
(a) Productivity profile ωa,h by age
and income
(b) Time allocation by age
(c) Income over life-cycle
Figure 3.2: Main calibration results
3.4 Results of Numerical Simulation
This paper analyzes direct and indirect, i.e. general equilibrium effects of heat
waves, public adaptation to heat waves and different ways of financing adaptation
measures.
3.4.1 Scenarios
As is shown in Table 3.4, we discern between two states of the world and two
states of the Swiss economy. The two states of the world are: (A) There is no
heat wave. (B) There is a 2003 like heat wave. The two states of the Swiss
Economy are differentiated in category I: (1) there is no adaptation at all. (2)
There is optimal adaption. In the benchmark case, there is no heat wave and the
economy is not adapted to them (a combination of state (A) and (1)). As we are
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interested in the effect of adaptation if a heat wave hits the Swiss economy, state
of the world B (there is a heat wave) is the focus of our analysis. In the first
scenario, Non-Adapt, the Swiss economy is hit by a 2003 like heat wave but not
adapted. In this scenario the reference case is the benchmark without heat wave
and adaptation. All other, optimal adaptation scenarios use the scenario Non-
Adapt as reference to show the impact of adaptation in a world that is hit by an
heat wave. If an economy optimally adapts to a heat waves through governmental
interventions, the issue of how to finance public adaptation measures matters. In
the following, we discriminate between four different policy options for financially
funding optimal adaptation to heat waves. These are labeled Cap-Tax, Lab-
Tax, Con-Tax and Inh-Tax, respectively. In both Cap-Tax and Lab-Tax the
government levies taxes on factor income, i.e. on capital income in scenario
Cap-Tax and on labor income in scenario Lab-Tax. In scenario Inh-Tax, the
government levies taxes on the share of capital that cohorts receive in form of
inheritance from heat wave victims. In contrast, in the fourth type Con-Tax
the government taxes expenditure on consumption goods. Table 3.4 gives an
overview on the derived scenarios.
State of the World
A - There is no heat wave
Benchmark without heat waves and adaptation
B - There is a heat wave
State of the Swiss Economy
No Adaptation Optimal Adaptation
Scenario Non-Adapt Scenario Cap-Tax, Lab-Tax, Con-Tax, Inh-Tax
Economy is not
adapted to a 2003
like heat wave
Economy is optimal adapted to a 2003 like heat wave,
optimal adaptation is financed by revenue from capital,
labor, consumption, or inheritance taxes
Table 3.4: Overview on the five scenarios to analyze heat wave and adaptation
impacts
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3.4.2 Assessment of Heat Wave Impacts in a Non-Adapted
Economy
Let us start the analysis by considering scenario Non-Adapt in which a non-
adapted Swiss economy is hit by a 2003-like heat wave. We split the analysis of
the impacts in two parts: first we present the direct impacts, i.e. the impact on
mortality. Second, we describe the general equilibrium impacts that result from
the heat wave induced shock in mortality. Throughout chapter 3.4.2, we use the
benchmark (no heat wave and no adaptation) as reference.
3.4.2.1 Impact on mortality
The impact of a 2003-like heat wave on mortality of cohorts of age 60 and older in
a non-adapted economy is summarized in Table 3.5. The first column shows the
average number of deaths per month in Switzerland between June and August if
no heat wave occurs. There are no official projections of mortality rates available
for Switzerland. Therefore, we used the population projections for 2020 (BFS,
2015b), the cohort shares in 2010 (BFS, 2015a) and the average monthly mortality
between 2004 and 2013 (BFS, 2014a) to derive expected death per month between
June and August in 2020.
We use the optimistic and the pessimistic data set derived on basis of Grizea
et al. (2005) (see chapter 3.3.1) to estimate the number of excess death if a 2003
like heat wave hits Switzerland in 2020. The results are presented in column two
and three of Table 3.5. In the optimistic case we estimate 1509 heat-wave-caused
excess deaths in 2020. In the pessimistic case these number increases to 1581
heat-wave-caused excess deaths in 2020. For comparison, Grizea et al. (2005)
estimated 975 heat-wave-caused excess deaths between June, July and August
(JJA) in 2003.
Remember that neither an increase in intensity or duration of heat waves, nor
the impact of demographic change has been taken into account to derive heat
wave excess death for 2020. Therefore, we have to take into account that these
projections are rather underestimated, because, for example, demographic trends
predict an increase in the share of older cohorts compared to young.
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Death per month between
June and August
Fatalities in Scenario Non-
Adapt from
HWEM opt HWEM pes
2010 2020 2010 2020 2010 2020
60
u 59 70 2 2 3 3
s 111 133 7 9 8 9
r 72 86 0 0 0 0
65
u 78 93 3 3 5 6
s 145 173 10 12 10 12
r 93 111 1 1 1 1
70
u 104 149 5 7 8 12
s 167 241 11 16 17 25
r 112 161 4 5 4 5
75
u 158 215 11 14 12 17
s 244 332 16 22 25 34
r 172 235 9 11 6 8
80
u 248 302 20 24 22 27
s 331 403 34 41 45 55
r 248 302 15 18 12 14
85
u 662 977 77 113 75 110
s 745 1099 88 130 101 149
r 579 855 51 75 27 40
65+ 4328 5937 1092 1509 1143 1581
Table 3.5: Impact of a 2003-like heat wave on mortality in Scenario Non-Adapt
3.4.2.2 General Equilibrium Impacts in Scenario Non-Adapt
In a second step, we analyze general equilibrium effects that are caused by an
increase in mortality if a 2003 like heat wave hits the non-adapted Swiss economy.
Therefore, we differentiate between impacts on (1) labor supply, (2) output, (3)
prices (4) consumption and (5) welfare. Table 3.6 presents the impact of a heat-
wave-induced excess mortality on labor supply. Given the specification of our
model, effects of heat waves on labor supply depend directly on the heat wave
excess mortality in working age and indirectly on changes of (reservation) wages
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and income. Labor supply decreases for all age groups, independently of the use
of the optimistic or the pessimistic data set for heat wave excess mortality. The
higher the cohorts age, the greater the decrease in labor supply. The greatest
decrease of 10% is with the most vulnerable working cohort, who is of low income,
age 70 and living in suburban regions. The impact increases the higher the income
of the cohort, with the exception of the youngest. The older the cohort, the
greater the decrease in labor supply for cohorts of suburban, followed by urban
regions.
HWEM opt HWEM pes
u s r u s r
20 1 −0.196 −0.196 −0.196 −0.214 −0.214 −0.214
3 −0.112 −0.112 −0.112 −0.121 −0.121 −0.121
5 −0.075 −0.075 −0.075 −0.081 −0.081 −0.081
30 1 −0.025 −0.017 −0.095 −0.029 −0.019 −0.110
3 −0.256 −0.321 −0.301 −0.296 −0.370 −0.347
5 −4.452 −5.071 −1.195 −5.144 −5.859 −1.380
40 1 −0.023 −0.023 −0.122 −0.030 −0.030 −0.158
3 −0.196 −0.347 −0.322 −0.254 −0.449 −0.416
5 −2.830 −4.814 −1.040 −3.658 −6.221 −1.345
50 1 −0.036 −0.040 −0.206 −0.045 −0.050 −0.257
3 −0.248 −0.521 −0.455 −0.310 −0.652 −0.570
5 −5.876 0.000 −1.302 −7.355 0.000 −1.630
60 1 −3.347 −6.750 −0.435 −4.648 −6.950 −0.440
3 −3.646 −8.031 −0.952 −4.955 −8.262 −0.960
70 1 −4.435 −6.537 0.000 −7.690 −9.994 0.000
Table 3.6: Impact of HWEM on labor supply in scenario Non-Adapt using the
example of income cohorts {h = 1, 3, 5} and age {a = 20, 30, ..., 70} in percentage
change
Table 3.7 presents the impact of a 2003-like heat wave excess mortality
on output Y and changes in factor prices for labor (PL) and capital (PK).
The production function is of CES type. Thus, a decrease in the total labor
supply with constant total capital supply reduces the production output by
0.47%, respectively 0.1% in the pessimistic case. In equilibrium, the elasticity
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of substitution equals the percentage change in the capital-labor-ratio relative
to the percentage change in the wage-interest-ratio; σ = (%ΔK/L)/(%Δw/r).
Because of a positive elasticity of substitution, the increase in the capital-labor-
ratio results, as expected, in an increase in the wage-interest-ratio (see Table 3.7).
Production output is solely used for private consumption. Thus, overall private
Scenario Non-Adapt
HWEM opt HWEM pes
Y −0.470 −0.102
PL 0.163 0.199
PK −0.235 −0.286
Table 3.7: Impact of a 2003-like heat wave on mortality in an optimally adapted
Swiss Economy
consumption is reduced in consequence of the decrease in production. Figure
3.3 compares the impact on private consumption using the optimistic and the
pessimistic data set for heat wave excess mortality.
All age wise, invulnerable cohorts (a < 60) increase their consumption by
between 0.19 and 11.98%, while all age wise, strongly vulnerable cohorts (a > 60)
decrease their consumption by between −0.95 and −13.85%. Besides age, the
consumption adjustment depends also on the regional vulnerability. Cohorts
of age 60 in rural regions increase their consumption while vulnerable ones in
suburban and urban regions decrease theirs.
While vulnerable cohorts in suburban and urban regions decrease their
consumption by between −3.61 and −12.01%, less vulnerable cohorts in rural
regions decrease their consumption by only −0.95 to −9.01%. The consumption
increase for cohorts between 30 and 50 depends also heavily on their income
level. While the consumption of cohorts in the lower income group {h = 1, 2, 3}
increase their consumption by about 1%, cohorts in the highest income group (5)
increase their consumption by up to 14.5% ({a = 35, h = 5, t = s}).
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Figure 3.3: Impact of 2003-like HWEM on private demand for consumption in
scenario Non-Adapt using the example of income cohorts {h = 1, 3, 5} of age
{a = 20, 30, ..., 80} in percentage change.
Changes in labor supply and consumption have an impact on cohorts utility,
which is of CES type with leisure and consumption as arguments. Premature
death reduces cohort sizes and hence their sums of utilities.
Figure 3.4 presents Hicksian equivalent variation in percentage change. From
it we can draw the conclusion that welfare impacts of heat waves depend
predominantly on the age of the respective cohort. Cohorts at an age with
a high probability to inherit capital from heat wave fatalities increase their
consumption and thus their utility level. With respect to the income group,
this result is the strongest for wealthy cohorts, because they received the highest
share of heritage and use it to increase consumption. On the other hand, Hicksian
equivalent variation of young survivors (a < 60), with a lower or middle income
(h < 4) amounts to 0.12 and 1.33%. Relating to the urban form, we find
suburban and urban young cohorts benefiting most, for two reasons. First,
the parents of these cohorts have the highest fatality rates and second, these
cohorts own already in the initial situation the highest share of capital and
profit now from inheritance. In consequence of HWEM , the size of vulnerable
cohorts of age 70 to 85 is reduced and their share in total population decreases.
Fatalities leave the economy and their utility from consumption and leisure no
longer contribute to the cohorts utility. As a result, we find a negative Hicksian
equivalent variation of between −0.04(−0.07) and −0.18%(−0.22%) in case of the
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optimistic (pessimistic) data set. The decrease in welfare is higher, the higher
the income group is. Vulnerable cohorts of age 60 and 65 benefit, in terms of
utility, more from inheritance than they lose because of the increase in heat wave
excess mortality.
Figure 3.4: Hicksian equivalent variation in scenario 1 − NA using the example
of income cohorts {h = 1, 3, 5} in percentage change.
To evaluate the results from a social welfare perspective, the aggregated
equivalent variation is computed as sum of the cohort-size-weighted equivalent
variation of survivors, see equation 3.9.
EV Scenario =
∑
a,h,t
[
Ma,h,tua,h,t −Na,h,tu0a,h,t
Na,h,tu0a,h,t
]
(3.9)
The overall aggregated equivalent variation in the case of the optimistic
(pessimistic) data set for HWEM measures −0.010%(−0.011%).
We can summarize the key results of this section as follows. If a stylized,
non-adapted economy, that features the characteristics of the Swiss household
structure with respect to age, region and income distribution between 2006 and
2008, is shocked with a 2003-like heat wave excess mortality, general equilibrium
effects result in negative welfare impacts for the aggregated economy, although
some young cohorts, especially those with high income in urban and suburban
areas increase their utility. In consequence, we find next to the negative welfare
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effect also a negative impact on the distribution of income.
3.4.3 Assessment of Heat Wave Impacts in an Optimally
Adapted Economy
Compared to the non-adapted economy, the number of fatalities is reduced in
an optimally adapted economy to nearly zero. Only the oldest cohorts (a ≥ 80)
suffer from an excess mortality that results in 16 heat wave caused fatalities.
Thus, although all age groups, especially young cohorts, have to pay taxes in
order to finance adaptation, social welfare maximization results in an almost
fully adapted economy (see Table 3.12).
3.4.3.1 Impact on Mortality in an Optimally Adapted Economy,
Scenario Lab-Tax
Compared to the non-adapted economy, the number of fatalities decreases in an
optimally adapted economy to nearly zero. Only the oldest aged cohorts (a ≥ 80)
suffer from an excess mortality that results in 9 heat wave caused fatalities. This
result changes only slightly if instead of the optimistic, the pessimistic data set
on HWEM is used. Thus, although especially young cohorts have to pay labor
taxes in order to finance adaptation, social welfare maximization results in an
almost fully adapted economy (see Table 3.8).
2020
60 65 70 75 80 85 60+ JJA
u s r u s r u s r u s r u s r u s r
HWEM opt
Non-Adapt 2 9 0 3 12 1 7 16 5 14 22 11 24 41 18 113 130 75 1513
Lab-Tax 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 12
HWEM pes
Non-Adapt 3 9 0 6 12 1 12 25 5 17 34 8 27 55 14 86 149 40 1510
Lab-Tax 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 9
Table 3.8: Impact of a 2003-like heat wave on mortality in an optimally adapted
Swiss economy
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3.4.3.2 General Equilibrium Impacts in an Optimally Adapted Econ-
omy, Scenario Lab-Tax
In this section we assume that the government provides optimal adaptation that
is financed via a labor tax. Thus, cohorts at working age bear the burden to
finance the decrease in excess mortality of cohorts older than 60 if a 2003 like
heat wave occurs. Again, we analyze the impact on (1) labor supply, (2) output,
(3) prices (4) consumption and (5) welfare. As reference we use the scenario
Non-Adapt.
Table 3.9 summarizes the impact of a 2003 like heat wave in an optimally
adapted economy in which the adaption stock is financed with taxes on labor,
compared to the scenario Non-Adapt. The labor supply increases if we assume
optimistic (pessimistic) data on HWEM by between 0.01(0) and 9.17% (12.73%).
This impact is higher the more vulnerable the cohort is.
Compared to the baseline scenario without heat waves and adaptation, capital
becomes, because of the taxation of labour, relatively cheaper. Thus, labour
supply decreases by between −0.008 and −1.542% and we find an overall decrease
of −0.058%. This impact is higher for cohorts of higher age and income.
The impact on output and prices in an optimally adapted economy is
presented in Table 3.10. Independently of the use of the optimistic or the
pessimistic data set for HWEM, the labor tax rate to finance optimal adaptation
amounts to 0.4%. The production output decreases in both scenarios. However,
production increases in case of optimal adaption compared to the scenario Non-
Adapt by 0.43, respectively by 0.531%. In case of optimal adaptation, the prices
for capital and labor decreases, compared to the benchmark, but, the price for
labor is stronger than the price for capital.
Private consumption decreases strongly if a non-adapted economy is hit by
a heat wave (see Figure 3.3). The contrary is true if the economy is optimally
adapted. Compared to the scenario Non-Adapt, the impact on consumption
behaves mirror-inverted. The provided adaptation results in a decrease of the
consumption advantage for younger cohorts and a decrease of the consumption
disadvantage for vulnerable cohorts of age 60 and older. Compared to the baseline
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HWEM opt HWEM pes
u s r u s r
20 1 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.206 0.206 0.206
3 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.102 0.102 0.102
5 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.053 0.053 0.053
30 1 0.017 0.009 0.087 0.020 0.011 0.101
3 0.236 0.301 0.281 0.275 0.350 0.327
5 4.582 5.256 1.171 5.341 6.134 1.360
40 1 0.014 0.014 0.112 0.021 0.021 0.148
3 0.174 0.323 0.298 0.231 0.425 0.392
5 2.822 4.917 1.003 3.702 6.485 1.313
50 1 0.023 0.027 0.176 0.032 0.037 0.226
3 0.200 0.443 0.384 0.261 0.572 0.497
5 5.416 0 1.125 7.064 0 1.454
60 1 3.376 7.105 0.169 4.779 7.347 0.166
3 3.417 7.447 0.199 4.824 7.699 0.181
70 1 4.294 6.608 0 7.935 10.666 0
Table 3.9: Impact of a 2003-like heat wave on labor supply in an optimally
adapted economy compared to Non-Adapt in %, Scenario Lab-Tax
scenario without heat waves and adaptation, the consumption decreases if a heat
wave hits an optimally adapted economy by maximal −0.4%.
Similar to consumption, we also find the strong cohort dependent impact of a
heat wave in a non-adapted economy on utility nearly fully erased if the economy
is optimally adapted to a 2003 like heat wave (see Figure 3.4 and 3.6). However,
this impact is stronger if we assume the optimistic data set for heat wave excess
mortality.
This effect of optimal adaptation becomes more obvious if we compare the
impact of a heat wave on a non-adapted and an optimally adapted economy
to the benchmark. Compared to these benchmarks in a non-adapted economy,
cohorts of age 30 − 55 profit greatly, in terms of utility, from the heat wave
(EV of up to 12%, see Figure 3.6) we find much weaker and less cohorts de-
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Non-Adapt Lab-Tax
compared to Benchmark compared to Non-Adapt
HWEM opt HWEM pes HWEM opt HWEM pes
Y −0.470 −0.102 0.430 0.531
PL 0.163 0.199 −0.538 −0.589
PK −0.235 −0.286 0.233 0.284
Table 3.10: Impact of a 2003-like heat wave on output and factor prices in
Switzerland in the optimal adaptation scenario Lab-Tax
Figure 3.5: Impact of 2003-like HWEM on private consumption in an optimally
adapted Swiss economy (scenario Lab-Tax compared to Non-Adapt)
pendent results for an optimally adapted economy. For cohorts of age 20 to 55
we find in an optimally adapted economy an EV of between 0 and −0.29%. This
decrease is less extreme for high income groups. The EV in an optimally adapted
economy lies for cohorts older than 60 between −0.18 and 0.014%. However,
there is virtually no change in the utility of cohorts older than 65 and of high
income. The overall equivalent variation that compares total welfare effects of a
heat wave in an optimal versus a non-adapted economy is presented in Table 3.11.
We can summarize the key result of a heat wave shock to a stylized,
optimally adapted economy that finances the optimal adaptation with labor
taxes and features the characteristics of the Swiss households with respect to
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Figure 3.6: Hicksian equivalent variation in case a heat wave hits an optimally
adapted Swiss economy (scenario Lab-Tax compared to Non-Adapt)
HWEM opt HWEM pes
EV in % change 0.008 0.009
Table 3.11: Welfare impact of heat waves in scenario Lab-Tax compared to Non-
Adapt
age, region and income distribution between 2006 and 2008 as follows: The
main distribution impacts that result from heat waves in a non-adapted economy
are eliminated at relatively low expenses. The optimal adaptation reduces the
decrease in labor supply strongly, although labor taxes are used to finance
adaptation. Consequently, we find a strong decrease of negative impacts on
output, consumption and welfare.
3.4.4 General Equilibrium Impacts in an Optimally Adapted
Economy
In this chapter we compare different strategies to finance optimal adaptation
to heat waves in Switzerland by analyzing general equilibrium impacts of heat
waves in the four scenarios of category II (see Table 3.4). The reference case is
the scenario Non-Adapt. Because we compare the impact in all four different
scenarios, we present in this section only the results of the optimistic data set for
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heat wave excess mortality.
In this section we assume that the government provides an optimal adaptation
level that is financed via a capital (scenario Cap-Tax ), labor (scenario Lab-Tax ),
consumption (scenario Con-Tax ) or an inheritance tax (scenario Inh-Tax ) in
order to maximize total welfare in a heat wave affected economy. Similar to
chapter 3.4.2.2, we differentiate between impacts on (1) labor supply, (2) output,
(3) prices (4) consumption and (5) welfare. Impacts are evaluated in comparison
to scenario Non-Adapt.
Table 3.13 presents the impact of a heat-wave-induced excess mortality on
labor supply. Compared to scenario Non-Adapt, the direct impact of excess
mortality on labor supply behaves nearly mirror inverted. Consequently, the
direct impact of heat waves on labor supply via the reduction of the size of
cohorts at working age urban forms to zero. However, changes in factor prices
and income because of taxation drives the impact on labor supply compared to
the baseline scenario in the four different optimal adaptation scenarios. On the
one hand, the impact on labor supply is, compared to the scenario Non-Adapt
and independent of the taxation strategy, clearly reduced. On the other hand,
the impact increases, similar to the scenario Non-Adapt, with age.
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Death per month between June and August
Non-Adapt Cap-Tax Lab-Tax Con-Tax Inh-Tax
60
u 2 0
s 9 0
r 0 0
65
u 3 0
s 12 0
r 1 0
70
u 7 0
s 16 0
r 5 0
75
u 14 0
s 22 0
r 11 0
80
u 24 0
s 41 0 1 0 0
s 18 0
85
u 113 1 1 1 1
s 130 2 2 2 2
s 75 1 0 1 1
60 + JJA 1509 12 12 12 12
Table 3.12: Impact of a 2003-like heat wave on mortality in optimally adapted
economy by funding strategy
In scenario Cap-Tax, cohorts of age 30 and older, and especially more
productive, high income cohorts increase their labor supply by low margin of
maximal 0.49%. Factor demand for labor becomes, because of the taxation
of capital, relatively cheaper and is thus increased. Overall, the labor supply
increases slightly by 0.004%.
The contrary is true for Scenario Lab-Tax ; capital becomes, because of the
taxation of labour, relatively cheaper. Thus, labour supply reduces by between
−0.008 and −1.542% and an overall decrease of −0.058%. Again, we find higher
impacts for cohorts of higher age and income.
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In scenario Con-Tax, adaptation is financed by the taxation of consumption.
This form of funding distributes the tax burden between all cohorts and has the
least impact on factor supply. The demand for consumption goods decreases only
slightly and thus also production and the demand for factor inputs only adjust
minimally. Labour supply decreases in cohorts slightly by between −0.005 and
−0.262% and overall by −0.017%. The funding of adaptation by an inheritance
tax in scenario Inh-Tax has the least impact on labour supply. The overall
decrease amounts to only −0.002%. Because the inheritance tax is a special form
of the taxation of capital, we again find some cohorts which increase their labour
supply. These are especially cohorts of age 60, 65 and 70 living in rural regions.
Cap-Tax Lab-Tax Con-Tax Inh-Tax
20
1 0.193 0.193 0.193 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.196 0.196 0.196
3 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.111 0.111 0.111
5 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.073 0.073 0.073
30
1 0.022 0.014 0.093 0.017 0.009 0.087 0.020 0.012 0.091 0.024 0.016 0.095
3 0.251 0.316 0.296 0.236 0.301 0.281 0.246 0.311 0.291 0.255 0.320 0.300
5 4.665 5.350 1.204 4.582 5.256 1.171 4.636 5.317 1.192 4.650 5.331 1.206
40
1 0.020 0.020 0.120 0.014 0.014 0.112 0.018 0.018 0.118 0.022 0.022 0.122
3 0.191 0.344 0.318 0.174 0.323 0.298 0.185 0.337 0.311 0.194 0.346 0.320
5 2.923 5.082 1.049 2.822 4.917 1.003 2.888 5.024 1.033 2.901 5.037 1.046
50
1 0.034 0.039 0.212 0.023 0.027 0.176 0.030 0.035 0.200 0.034 0.039 0.202
3 0.252 0.539 0.469 0.200 0.443 0.384 0.234 0.505 0.440 0.242 0.512 0.447
5 6.471 0.000 1.360 5.416 − 1.125 6.104 − 1.278 6.116 0.000 1.291
60
1 3.433 7.165 0.523 3.376 7.105 0.169 3.413 7.144 0.400 3.440 7.173 0.557
3 3.824 8.982 1.167 3.417 7.447 0.199 3.683 8.448 0.830 3.874 9.152 1.276
70 1 4.701 7.032 0.000 4.294 6.608 − 4.559 6.885 − 4.552 6.878 0
Table 3.13: Impact of HWEM on labor supply in optimal adaptation scenarios
using the example of cohorts {h = 1, 3, 5} and {a = 20, 30, ..., 80} in percentage
change compared to scenario Non-Adapt
Table 3.14 presents the impact of a 2003-like heat wave excess mortality on
output Y and changes in factor prices PL and PK in an optimally adapted
compared to a non-adapted economy. We find a production decrease of about
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0.47% in a non-adapted economy. Compared to this, the production increase in an
optimal compared to a non-adapted economy measures between 0 .32 and 0.45%.
This results, compared to the baseline scenario, in a decrease in the production
shortage in all four optimal adaptation scenarios by between −0.148% (Cap-Tax )
and −0.02% (Con-Tax).
Comparing the tax shares of each scenario, we clearly see that the decrease of
taxation base from scenario Con-Tax to Cap-Tax to Lab-Tax to Inh-Tax results
in an increase of the tax rate. On the one hand, taxing all (consuming) cohorts
results in a low consumption tax of 0.2%. On the other hand, the tax base in
scenario Inh-Tax is not even high enough to finance optimal adaptation. Each
heir would need to pay twelvefold of his heritage to finance optimal adaptation.
Thus, they have to decrease their capital stock slightly.
Non-Adapt Cap-Tax Lab-Tax Con-Tax Inh-Tax
Y −0.470 0.323 0.430 0.452 0.441
PL 0.163 −0.313 −0.538 −0.169 −0.190
PK −0.235 −0.093 0.233 0.245 0.275
τ - 0.005 0.004 0.002 12.7
Table 3.14: Impact of HWEM on output & factor prices in optimal adaptation
scenarios by financing strategy compared to each other (in percentage change)
On the one hand, the funding strategy for adaptation determines which
cohorts have to share the main burden from taxation. Consequently, the
impact on consumption varies by optimal adaptation scenario. On the other
hand, because mortality is so drastically reduced in all four optimal adaption
scenarios, we find, compared to scenario Non-Adapt, mirror-inverted impacts on
consumption and consequently also on utility, nearly independently of the funding
strategy for optimal adaptation. Therefore, Figure 3.7 shows representative for
all other funding strategies the impact of a 2003 like heat wave in an optimal
compared to a non-adapted economy, where the adaptation is financed via capital
taxes.
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Figure 3.7: Impact of 2003-like HWEM on private demand for consumption in
scenario Cap-Tax compared to scenario Non-Adapt using the example of cohorts
{h = 1, 3, 5} and {a = 20, 30, ..., 80} in percentage change
To get further insights on the impact of the funding strategy, we compare
results of all four optimal adaptation scenarios with the benchmark case, see 3.8.
In scenario Cap-Tax older cohorts and those of high income groups are especially
affected as they own the main share of capital. Thus, we find a decrease in
consumption for these cohorts of between −0.195 and −0.328% compared to the
benchmark. With respect to age, the contrary is true for Scenario Lab-Tax. The
main burden of taxation is carried by labour supplying cohorts between 20 and
55. They decrease their consumption by up to −0.403%. Some high income
cohorts of age 60 and 65 even increase their consumption slightly by between
0.005 and 0.02%. Consumption of cohorts older than 65 decreases only slightly
by maximal −0.002% and is mainly caused by (the low number) of heat wave
fatalities. The tax burden is shared most equal between all cohorts in Scenario
Con-Tax, because they all use their income for consumption expenditure only.
Consequently, the consumption decrease for all cohorts is relatively small and
lies between −0.191 and −0.245%.
In scenario Inh-Tax we find the tax burden is even higher than the heritage
and concentrated on cohorts of age 60 and 65. This is the consequence of the
strong decrease in heat wave excess mortality through adaptation that causes
only a few heat wave fatalities of age 80 and 85. Thus cohorts of age 60 and 65
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share the burden of adaptation to heat waves. Cohorts older than 70 increase
their consumption slightly. Because the factor supply stays nearly constant, the
production decrease is only caused by a shortage in consumption demand of
cohorts of age 60 and 65 that is partly outweighed by an increase in consumption
of older cohorts. With respect to income, we find, similar to scenario Cap-Tax,
a stronger decrease on consumption for high income cohorts as they own the
highest share of capital before and after taxation.
Figure 3.8: Impact of 2003-like HWEM on private demand for consumption in
scenario Cap-Tax compared to scenario Non-Adapt using the example of cohorts
{h = 1, 3, 5} and {a = 20, 30, ..., 80} in percentage change
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Similar to Figure 3.7, we see in Figure 3.8 the mirror-inverted impact on
cohort’s utility in the optimal adaptation scenario Cap-Tax, representative of all
other optimal adaptation scenarios, compared to the Scenario Non-Adapt.
Figure 3.9: Impact of 2003-like HWEM on private demand for consumption in
scenario Cap-Tax compared to scenario Non-Adapt using the example of cohorts
{h = 1, 3, 5} and {a = 20, 30, ..., 80} in percentage change
To get further insights on the impact of the funding strategy on the utility
of cohorts, we compare all four optimal adaption scenarios with the benchmark
scenario. Figure 3.10 presents Hicksian equivalent variation compared to the
benchmark in percentage change. Because of the structure of our model, we
can draw the conclusion that welfare impacts in an optimally adapted economy
predominantly depend on changes in consumption behavior caused by taxation.
Because of the strongly reduced heat waves excess mortality, there are virtually
no changes in labor leisure choice.
The overall aggregated equivalent variation in all 4 scenarios compared to
scenario Non-Adapt is summarized in table 3.11. Scenario Inh-Tax has the
highest welfare increase, while the taxation of labor results in the smallest
increase.
We can summarize the results of this section as follows: If a stylized, optimally
adapted economy that features the characteristics of the Swiss household sector
with respect to age, region and income distribution is shocked with a 2003-
85
Figure 3.10: Hicksian equivalent variation in optimal adaptation scenarios using
the example of cohorts {h = 1, 3, 5} and {a = 20, 30, ..., 80} in percentage change.
like heat wave, welfare, output and distribution impacts depend on the funding
strategy to finance adaptation. However, all four funding strategies for optimal
adaptation result in a strong decrease of HWEM compared to the scenario
without any adaptation.
Levying taxes on capital has the worst impact on overall production output,
compared to the benchmark. Vulnerable cohorts bear the main burden of
financing adaptation. On the one hand, this approach may not fit the principle
of burden sharing. On the other hand, this scenario mirrors private adaptation
best because a part of the capital of vulnerable cohorts would be used to invest
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Cap-Tax Lab-Tax Con-Tax Inh-Tax
EV %opt 0.008 0.0080 0.0082 0.0095
EV %pes 0.010 0.0096 0.0098 0.0112
Table 3.15: Welfare impact of heat waves in an optimally adapted economy by
financing strategy compared to scenario Non-Adapt
in a (private) adaptation.
The contrary is true for scenario Lab-Tax. Here, tax base is slightly increased
and the invulnerable majority of the population bears the burden of taxation.
Additionally, the decrease in production output is, compared to scenario Cap-
Tax, greatly decreased from −0.148 to −0.042%.
In scenario Con-Tax additionally increased and thus we find a low consump-
tion tax rate of only 0.2%. The tax burden is almost equally shared between all
cohorts and therefore vulnerable, as well as invulnerable cohorts have to pay for
adaptation to heat waves that reduce the excess mortality in high age cohorts.
The consumption tax result in the lowest impact on production output compared
to all other scenarios.
In scenario Inh-Tax, the government would need to introduce a penalty tax
for those cohorts who would profit from residual excess mortality in form of
inheritance. However, to reach the adaption stock that is necessary to optimally
adapt to heat waves, these cohorts would have to pay a multiple of their
inheritance. This approach is clearly not feasible and puts a very high burden on
a small share of the population. Additionally, it is important to keep in mind that
this is not the share of the population that would profit most from inheritance
in a non-adapted economy, because these are the 30 − 40 years old cohorts.
To check the robustness of the results, a sensitivity analysis of all crucial
parameter values was carried out. Parameter which influence our results
can be differentiated by one important characteristic. On the one hand, we
have parameter that describe the optimization problem of the households and
change the results of the calibration. These parameter are σclh , the elasticity
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of substitution between consumption and leisure, ϕh, the consumption share
parameter, the interest rate and ζscaleh , ζ
age
h and ζ
age2
h the parameter which describe
the productivity profile of the households. On the other hand, we have parameter
that influence the results of the core of our analysis, the impact of heat waves
and adaptation to them. These results are mainly driven by the heat wave excess
mortality Πa,t and the adaptation efficiency parameter ψ. For the first group
of parameter we know from economic theory how the up or down scaling of the
parameter values will influence our results. However, analyzing the magnitude of
this change requires a change in the calibration output. That would cause our
analysis to be influenced by a whole new data basis which also would not fit the
official Swiss retirement age.
3.5 Concluding Thoughts
Within the framework of adaptation to extreme climate events in developed
countries, this paper gives an approach on how to evaluate non-market damage
from climate extreme events in a general equilibrium approach. This allows
us to overcome the procedure of evaluating non-market damage, in particular
fatalities, from climate extreme events by counting the number of excess death
and, sometimes, evaluating them with a value of statistical life. The new approach
allows us first, to determine the magnitude of general equilibrium impacts of a
2003-like heat wave on the Swiss economy and second, to compare the economic
impacts of different strategies to finance optimal adaptation to heat waves if it
has the characteristic of a public good.
We claimed that general equilibrium effects are crucial to overcome the
commonly used approach of measuring non-market damage from extreme weather
events by evaluating the number of fatalities with the value of a statistical
life. Our approach accounts for secondary effects and thus, makes it possible
to differentiate between welfare losses and damage in the output, i.e. market
damage that result from lower labor supply and total demand for consumption
goods. We are able to show how cohorts of different age, income and region are
affected, because we differentiate the demand side with respect to these three
characteristics that define the vulnerability to heat waves. This enables us to
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show that there are substantial differences in the impact of heat waves on cohorts
utility if an economy is not adapted. While young and not vulnerable cohorts
profit (in welfare terms) from heat waves, vulnerable but surviving cohorts utility
decreases. This result shows that without adaption, vulnerable cohorts are worse
off and may have fewer possibilities to invest in private adaptation. Either they
lose their lives, or they survive, but face a decrease in their utility. Thus heat
waves result in negative welfare and distribution impacts. So, the answer to
the title question is, yes, if we want to prevent redistribution effects that harm
already vulnerable cohorts.
Our model is based on Swiss income data that describe the distribution of
different types of income between household groups of different age, income and
residential region. This approach has two main advantages. Firstly, it allows a
regionally differentiated analysis without deriving regional input-output tables.
Secondly, it enables us to compare different strategies to fund the provision of
the public good adaptation.
The tax base for the inheritance tax is reduced with the reduction of heat wave
victims. Thus this tax is not suitable to finance an optimal adaptation stock.
The least welfare loss is generated if adaptation is financed with a capital or
consumption tax (depending on the optimistic or pessimistic data set). Funding
adaptation to heat waves with taxes on consumption, results in a moderate
welfare loss and a very low decrease in production output. Scenario labour tax
causes next to the largest welfare loss also the second largest (but still moderate)
decrease in production output. Overall, we showed that it is possible, at relatively
low economic costs (about 0.2% of the GDP), to reduce mortality from heat waves
drastically and to prevent strong distribution effects that are caused by a heat
wave if there is no adaptation.
Obviously, there are further options for extending the present analysis. The
most important one could be to enlarge the model to a dynamic one. To
overcome the problem of perfect foresight in standard OLG models, it may be
one opportunity to use a stochastic version. This extension would allow for
uncertainty. This is a reasonable assumption in the context of climate extreme
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events, which are characterised by low probability to occur, but a high impact if
they do occur. However, the possibility to simulate these models may be limited.
We leave these extensions to future research. Additionally, our model is not able
to image the potential welfare decrease of young households because they grieve
for the heat wave fatalities. Also, costs of increasing morbidity are not taken
into account because we have no reliable data that show this impact. The same
problem arises when it comes to the impact of heat waves on labor productivity.
We know from other studies (see for example Hu¨bler et al. (2008) and Hallegatte
et al. (2008)) that there is an impact, but we have no data on the impact of a
heat wave on Swiss labor productivity, especially because there are only a few
occupational groups affected.
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Chapter 4
Regional Flood Impacts and
Adaptation in a Federal Setting:
A Spatial Computable General
Equilibrium Analysis for
Switzerland
4.1 Introduction
According to the fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), the atmospheric carbon concentration is expected to
rise further during the 21st century. This could, combined with a growing
population and inappropriate land use, lead to a significant increase in the
frequency, intensity and the duration of water-related extreme events such as
floods (e.g. IPCC (2014)). Feyen et al. (2012), for example, estimate that in
Europe the annual damage caused by river flooding will more than triple till
the end of the century. Based on recorded observations, the Advisory Body for
Climate Research of the Swiss Federal Government (OcCC, 1999) reports that in
the Alps autumn and winter precipitation has already risen by more than 30%
during the last 100 years1. And model based predictions suggest that climatic
warming will cause significantly more and severe flood events in the Swiss Central
Plateau (Mittelland) and southern Switzerland, which could imply additional
flood-related costs in the order of magnitude of several hundred million Swiss
francs per year.
Economic impacts of floods are complex and difficult to assess (Jahn, 2014).
First, there are direct effects. Examples are damage on buildings and machinery
as well as the destruction of infrastructures such as roads or electricity and water
supply systems. Most of these damage can directly be expressed in monetary
units. For this reason, they are called market damage2 in contrast to non-market
damage such as injuries, losses of cultural heritage or psychological distress. The
latter ones are difficult to translate into monetary units and will be neglected in
our analysis. Secondly, there are indirect effects. The impact, which floods can
have on economies, goes beyond the direct local effects when water is coming into
contact with infrastructure, buildings, and other properties. Damages of existing
capital stocks and infrastructure can cause reductions, in more severe cases even
a disruption of economic activities. Because of interlinkages within and across
regional economies, this can set off a sequence of feedback reactions inside and
outside the flooded area, which typically last much longer than the flood itself.
While the analysis of direct market impacts is well established (for an
overview, see Penning-Roswell et al. (1996)), less knowledge is accumulated
with respect to indirect effects of flood events. In particular, economic aspects
are poorly understood so far. To our best knowledge, only a limited number
of papers discuss both direct and indirect impacts of flood disasters from an
economic perspective (Cochrane, 2004; Messner, 2007; Hallegatte and Przyluski,
2010; Green et al., 2011; Carrera et al., 2015). These papers have in common
that they combine a spatial analysis, which captures direct flood impacts, with
a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of a national economy, through
which indirect effects become visible.
1Historical climate records indicate that extreme precipitation events might occur significantly
more often than in recent years and the resulting damage could far exceed currently known
levels (OcCC, 1999).
2According to Hallegatte and Przyluski (2010) market losses include all damage, which can be
repaired or replaced through purchases on markets.
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What these papers do not consider, however, is how to protect a given region
against the adverse effect of flooding through adaptation. It is the main purpose
of this paper to analyze the latter issue and hence to give an answer to the
question, how to adapt efficiently to climatically caused flood events.
Mitigation and adaptation are the two major responses to global climate
change. Mitigation covers all strategies, which, through reducing greenhouse
gas emissions, are designed to solve this problem from the root. Adaptation
denotes the “process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects”
(IPCC, 2014). For more than two decades, mitigation was the main objective
of international climate policy. But due to already high atmospheric carbon
concentrations and due to the inertia of the climate system climate change
is unavoidable to some degree, even if today emissions were cut back almost
completely. This combined with high uncertainty about future climate change
policies has turned attention towards measures, which allow for reducing the
climate vulnerability of communities and regions and which can be implemented
on a national or regional scale with sufficient speed and scope.
As was shown by Buob and Stephan (2011) moderating the negative effects of
climate change through investing into adaptation is a key element of any rational
climate change policy. Some adaptation is in the self-interest of agents and hence
has the properties of a private good. But the majority of measures to adapt
to the rising risk of flood disasters has the features of a (local) public good.
Examples are land use planning, establishing protected areas or investing into
flood protection infra-structure such as dams. Seen from this perspective, the
optimal provision of flood adaptation requires policy interventions. However, the
adaptation to climate change is a rather complex challenge. On the one hand a
variety of measures exist, which differ in important aspects as the just mentioned
examples illustrate. On the other hand, adaptation very much depends on local
circumstances, which are known to local authorities, while a central governmental
authority often lacks the necessary information. It is the aim of our analysis (1) to
gain a better understanding of the economic impacts of floods, (2) to analyze the
issue of efficient flood adaptation from a regionally diversified perspective, and (3)
to analyze the issue of financing adaptation in a federalist system, where local
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and central governmental authorities interplay in the provision of local public
good adaptation.
As mentioned above, answering these questions requires a regional CGE
model. Despite the fact that the regionalization of CGE models is well
established, applying them to the issue of flood adaptation is a relatively new
one. To our knowledge, Jahn’s (2014) paper “A Spatial CGE Model for the
Analysis of Regional Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Policies” is so far
the only one. It is based on the RELU-TRAN model (Anas and Liu, 2007) and
was adopted for analyzing the impacts of flood events and adaptation measures
in the region of Hamburg. To this end, Jahn (2014) had to down scale a national
Input-Output table to this specific region. In contrast to that, our CGE model
is not based on a down scaled Input-Output table. Instead, we discern between
regions according to the degree of their exposure and vulnerability with respect to
floods events. Based on data of the Swiss Federal Institute for Forest, Snow, and
Landscape Research (WSL), which contains information about any flood event
in Switzerland for the time period 1970 to 2014, including the corresponding
damage (expressed in CHF) on community level, we are considering three different
regions3 of Switzerland. (1) A region of high exposure with high/catastrophic
damage above 2 million CHF or fatalities, (2) a region of medium exposure with
damage between 0.4 and 2 million CHF, (3) a region of low exposure damage
(between 0.1 and 0.4 million CHF) or of no exposure at all. An advantage of
our approach is that we account also for national impacts of regional events
and adaptation measures. Additionally, we are able to analyze the cooperation
between regional and national governmental authorities in financing regional
adaptation measures via different taxing and transfer scenarios.
Our results indicate three major findings: (1) General equilibrium effects,
which are caused by flood damage in highly vulnerable regions, also lead in regions
of low vulnerability to considerable welfare and GDP losses. (2) By providing
the local public good adaptation, it is, at low economic cost, possible to reduce
negative impacts on welfare, GDP as well as the allocation of resources between
3Note that these regions must not coincide with existing ones. They are artificially constructed
and represent a collection (set) of communities with similar properties with respect to flood
exposure and vulnerability.
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regions and sectors significantly. Finally, (3) funding the local public good with
a regional land tax should be preferred to a national output tax or a combination
of both with transfers from national to regional governments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents a description
of the modeling framework upon which our numerical analysis is based. Section
4.3 discusses data and numerical inputs into the analysis. Section 4.4 presents
the scenarios, section 4.5 the results and conclusions are drawn in Section 4.6.
4.2 Theoretical Modeling Approach
Our numerical thought experiments are based on a dynamic, spatial differentiated
Ramsey type Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. The degree at
which a specific region might be affected by flood events depends on the region’s
exposure and vulnerability. Vulnerability refers to the propensity of suffering
losses. It is determined by physical, social, political, economic, cultural and
institutional factors and can be moderated through investment into adaptation
measures. Exposure primarily is a geographical attribute. It characterizes areas,
in which people and economic assets are exposed to the hazard of flooding (for
details, see UNISDRS (2015)). According to that, the Swiss economy is divided
into R regions, which differ with respect to their flood exposure.
In each region r = {1, ..., R} a representative consumer maximizes the
discounted sum of the logarithm of consumption over the time horizon of
T periods t = {1, ..., T}. Instantaneous consumption depends on produced
commodities on the one hand and services of land for residential purposes
on the other. The production side of the regional economies is differentiated
into S sectors. Sectors differ with respect to the degree at which they are
vulnerable to flood events. For example, the flood vulnerability of sectors such
as forestry, agricultural production or transportation is significantly higher than
the vulnerability of the banking sector. Each sector s = {1, ..., S} produces a
specific, composite commodity and uses land, labor, capital as well as outputs
from others sectors as inputs into production.
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There are two categories of governments: R regional governments on the
one hand and a federal government on the other. Governments perform two
functions. They collect taxes and finance adaptation measures for preventing
against negative impacts of flood events and thus for reducing the regions’
vulnerability to floods.
4.2.1 Land and Impacts of Flood Events
Land plays a particular role in our analysis: (1) Land is immobile and hence
fixed to a specific region. (2) Land is an input into both regional production and
consumption. (3) Land is exposed to damage through floods.
As mentioned above, for analyzing the economic impacts of floods we have
to discern between direct and indirect impacts. Direct impacts concern flooding,
erosion, mudflow, sedimentary deposition and obstruction or damage caused by
driftwood. Land, as well as property assets that come into contact with water,
mud or flotsam, can be destroyed. To implement direct damage in our model we
apply the damage function approach proposed by Carrera et al. (2015). Let Lr(t)
denote the total gross endowment of land of region r at date t and let DLf,r(t)
denote damage, i.e. the fraction of land4, which is covered with water in case that
a reference flood f hits region r during period t. Consequently, during period
t only the remaining fraction is at region’s disposal for both consumption and
production purposes, i.e.,
Lnetr (t) = Lr(t)(1−DLf,r(t)) ≥ lHr (t) +
∑
s
lFr,s(t). (4.1)
lHr (t) is the fraction of land, which the representative consumer of region r uses
during period t for residential purposes, while lFr,s(t) is the fraction, which, in
region r, sector s uses as input into regional production.5 The impact a flood
has on the supply of land, DLf,r(t), depends on (1) the share
(
Af,r(t)
Lr(t)
)
of the total
area Lr(t) of land in a region that cannot be used for residential or production
4As will be explained below at some more detail, negative impacts of flood events can be
moderated through investing into adaptation. Therefore, damage depend on investment into
flood protection.
5As such there are four types of use for land: (1) residential, (2) agricultural, (3) industrial and
commercial, (4) for transportation and other services.
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purposes any more and (2) on the duration
(
Durf,r(t)
12
)
of flooding i.e. time period
(in month) during which the land cannot be used for residential purposes or as
factor of production, respectively. Therefore, we are able to construct damage
parameter for every reference flood f as follows:
DLf,r(t) =
(
Af,r(t)
Lr(t)
)(
Durf,r(t)
12
)
. (4.2)
Indirect economic impacts can be positive as well as negative. On the one hand
destroyed input factors can lead to economic losses especially in the sectors that
use those most. Furthermore there are indirect impacts on welfare because (1)
the supply of consumption goods is presumably reduced and (2) land cannot be
used for residential purposes. On the other hand, when it comes to reconstruction
activities there are potentially positive economic impacts (Berlemann and Vogt,
2007). Using the CGE approach, we will be able to identify both types of indirect
impacts.
4.2.2 Adaptation as Local Public Good
Flood damage can be moderated through implementing adaptation measures.
Some adaptation has the features of a private good and is in the self-interest of
economic agents, hence is autonomously done. Typical examples are choosing a
residence region that is not exposed to floods or buying flood insurance. Some
adaptation measures, however, have the properties of a local public good and
require governmental intervention. Typical examples are dams, spatial planning
measures or information and persuasion policies. While in our model private
adaptation is observed indirectly via reactions on price changes caused by floods,
adaptation, which has the features of a local public good is explicitly modeled.
There are two categories of governments: a federal government on the one hand
and regional governments on the other. The latter ones can be understood
as a federation of local communities, which are characterized by either high,
medium or low exposure to floods. They are not identical with real existing local
authorities.
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Local governments levy taxes on land for financing flood adaptation measures.
The federal government collects taxes on output for financing governmental
consumption, adaptation measures and/or transfers to the regional governments
for co-financing adaptation measures. The latter aspect is of particular
importance since it allows for analyzing distributional effects in the sense
that those, who contribute to financing a certain adaptation measure in a
certain region may not be the ones, who directly profit from this investment.
Additionally, we assume that adaptation measures, which are implemented by
regional governments are more effective in preventing damage than those, which
are implemented by the national government because of information deficits of
the later one. Another important characteristic of adaptation is that costs for
adaptation arise, in case of proactive adaptation, before the adaptation measure
is actually implemented.
Let the effect, which adaptation has on flood damage in region r, be expressed
by the function Ψr(ADr(t− v)), where similar to Stephan and Schenker (2012),
ADr(t − v) denotes the expenditure for adaptation measures that reduce flood
damage. In our approach ADr(t−v) equals governments expenditure in all sectors
s of region r, i.e. ADr(t− v) =
∑
s p
x
r,sadar,s. The parameter v accounts for the
possible time lag between expenditure and first effective use of the adaptation
measure. The adaptation function Ψr(ADr(t− v)) determines by how much the
flood damage can be reduced depending on expenditure for adaptation, i.e.:
Lnetr (t) = Lr(t)(1−DLf,r(t)Ψr(ADr(t− v))). (4.3)
The damage decreasing adaptation function is equal to one if the adaptation
spending is zero and converges to zero if the adaptation spending goes to infinity.
Furthermore, let the effect of adaptation on floods be characterized by decreasing
marginal benefits of adaptation, i.e.,
Ψr(ADr(t− v)) = e−ψGADr(t−v), (4.4)
ψG is the efficiency parameter of adaptation provided by the regional (G = R)
or the national (G = N) Government. The higher ψ, the more effective are
the adaptation expenditures. We set ψR ≥ ψN , because we assume adaptation
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expenditure of regional authorities to be more efficient in preventing damage
than adaptation expenditure of the national government for legal and political
reasons.6
Finally, let us assume that every government aims for a first best solution in
the sense that the optimal level of adaptation is reached if the value of marginal
benefits of adaptation equals the value of marginal costs of adaptation. Benefits
from adaptation are measured in prevented damage (PD(t)), i.e. gross damage in
case no adaptation is in place minus net damage in case a reference flood occurs
in an adapted economy.
PDr(t) = Lr(t)D
L
f,r(t)− Lr(t)DLf,r(t)Ψr(ADr(t− v))) (4.5)
In case of optimal adaptation, the value of marginal benefits of adaptation equals
the value of marginal costs of adaptation. In order to implement adaptation, the
(regional) government spends the earned tax revenue on (regional) sector outputs.
Marginal costs of adaptation (in a certain region) are therefore determined by the
prices for (regional) sectors output. The value of marginal benefits is determined
by the price of land (in a certain region) times the marginal benefit of adaptation,
i.e.
∂PDr(t)
∂ADr(t− v)p
l
r(t) =
∑
s
pxr,s(t− v) (4.6)
Independently on the funding scenario, we assume the governments’ budgets to
be balanced period by period.
4.2.3 Consumption
As mentioned above we are using a Ramsey type of a dynamic equilibrium model.
I.e., consumers are clairvoyant and maximize the discounted sum of expected
utilities subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. For being more precise,
6This assumption is discussed in more detail in chapter 4.3.3.
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let
Ur =
T∑
t=1
(
1
1 + ρ
)t αr ln(∑
s
ϕsc
σ
r,s(t)
) 1
σ
+ βr ln
(
lHr (t)
) (4.7)
be the intertemporal utility function of the representative consumer of region
r, where 1 + ρ is the utility discount factor. In any period t the consumer’s
instantaneous utility depends on the consumption of produced commodities cr,s(t)
as well as the use of land lHr (t) for residential purposes. σ is the elasticity of
substitution between produced commodities. αr and βr denote the relative shares
of consumption and land use, respectively.
As is usually assumed in a general equilibrium framework, consumers are the
owners of the factors of production. Let Kr(t) and Wr(t) denote the endowments
of capital and labor, respectively, which the representative consumer of region
r owns in period t. Both factors are completely flexible and are traded on
open interregional markets under perfect competition at present-value prices
pi(t), i = K,W . Furthermore suppose that the representative consumer owns
the regions endowment of land Lnetr (t). If the government levies taxes on both
mobile and immobile factors, then the intertemporal budget constraint INCr of
the representative consumer in region r is given by
INCr =
T∑
t=1
[(1− τK)pK(t)Kr(t) + (1− τW )pW (t)Wr(t)
+(1− τLr )pLr (t)
∑
s
lFr,s(t)] (4.8)
τ i, i = K,W,L is the tax rate on mobile capital, labor, and land, respectively.
pLr (t) denotes the region specific present value price of land.
Expenditure EXPr of consumer r must cover (1) his spending for the
consumption of produced commodities cr,s(t), (2) his savings, i.e., investment
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iKr (t) into the mobile capital stock and (3) his payments for land use l
H
r (t), i.e.,
EXPr =
T∑
t=1
∑
s
pxs (t) [(1− τ c)cr,s(t)] +
T∑
t=1
[
iKr (t) + p
L
r (t)l
H
r (t)
]
. (4.9)
pxs (t) denotes the present value prices of produced commodities from sector
s, which are traded on interregional open markets, while τ c are taxes on
consumption. Note that because of Walras’ law every representative consumer
has to stay on his budget constraint. The accumulation of total stock of mobile
capital over time is described by
K(t + 1) = (1 − δk)K(t) +
∑
r
ikr(t), (4.10)
where K(t+1) is the total stock of mobile capital and δk is the depreciation rate.
4.2.4 Production
In each region r, there are S production sectors. Each sector s produces a sector-
specific composite commodity. Inputs into sectoral production are factors, which
are traded nation-wide on open markets such as labor, capital and intermediate
inputs from other sectors, but also the immobile factor land. Production is
characterized by constant returns to scale and is described by a nested Cobb-
Douglas-CES production function. Let Xr,s(t) denote the net output of sector s
in region r during period t. The first stage of the sectoral production function is
given by
Xr,s(t) = Vr,s(t)
αslFr,s(t)
βs
∏
s
(∑
r
Yr,s(t)
vs
) γs
vs
, (4.11)
which combines in a Cobb-Douglas fashion value added Vr,s(t), land l
F
r,s(t) and
a CES aggregate
∏
s
(∑
r Yr,s(t)
vs
)
of intermediate inputs from other sectors and
regions. Value added Vr,s(t) is a CES aggregate of the mobile factors capital
kr,s(t) and labor wr,s(t),
Vr,s(t) = [κ (kr,s(t))
%s + (1− κ) (wr,s(t))%s ]
1
%s . (4.12)
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κ is the share parameter of mobile capital inputs and %s denotes the elasticity of
substitution between both input factors. Note that because of constant returns
to scale αs + βs + γs = 1, ∀s.
4.3 Data and Model Implementation
The theoretical model will be applied in a numerical analysis to gain a better
understanding of direct and indirect impacts of floods on the Swiss economy
on the one hand and to analyze and compare different strategies of financing
adaptation measures in Switzerland on the other. To that end, several numerical
inputs have to be specified. These are (1) parameter of the basic theoretical
model, (2) a regional Input-Output table and (3) data on the damage and
adaptation module of the model.
Periods are 5 years in length, 2010 is the initial year and the time horizon
covers 16 periods, i.e. 80 years. Basic theoretical model parameter like the
interest rate (0.05), the growth rate (0,01), the depreciation rate (0.07) as well
as the utility discount factor (0.962) are taken from the literature on standard
Ramsey growth models.
We calibrate the relative cost shares of the Cobb-Douglas part of the
production function (value added, land, intermediate inputs) and the utility
function (consumption aggregate and land used for residential proposes) to the
regional input-output table discussed below.
Substitution elasticities parameter have to be assigned for (1) intermediate
inputs in the production function, (2) for capital and labor inputs in value
added and (3) for consumption goods from different sectors in the consumption
aggregate of the utility function. All three parameter are set to 2 initially. The
impact of the substitution elasticities on the results are discussed in the sensitivity
analysis.
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4.3.1 Regional Input-Output Table and Basic Model Pa-
rameter
A regionalized Input-Output Table of Switzerland serves the empirical basis of
our analysis. This table is compiled from the official Input-Output Table of
Switzerland published by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (BFS) by using the
location quotient-based interregional input-output (IRIOLQ) framework (Jahn,
2016). We use this non-survey-based approach, because, in contrast to usual
spatially differentiated CGE models, the regions of our model do not coincide
with existing economic, political or organizational regions of Switzerland.
Instead, for the purpose of our analysis, Switzerland is divided into three
regions {h,m, l}, which differ with respect to their exposure to flood events. h
indicates high exposure, m medium exposure, while l indicates low or no exposure
at all. Communities are assigned to regions on the basis of information from
the Swiss flood and landslide damage database of the Swiss Federal Institute for
Forest, Snow, and Landscape Research (WSL). This data set contains data about
any flood event in Switzerland for the time period 1970 to 2014, including the
corresponding damage (expressed in CHF) on community level. Since data are
available on community level they have to be aggregated to our three regions
r = {h,m, l}. We use the classification of the WSL, which distinguishes between
high/catastrophic damage (more than 2 million CHF or fatalities), medium
damage (between 0.4 and 2 million CHF) and low or no damage at all damage
(less than 0.4 million CHF).
After determining the regions, we use the location quotient-based interregional
input-output (IRIOLQ) framework (Jahn, 2016) to develop an interregional
input-output table. This method combines the advantages of the location
quotients approach (developed by Flegg and Webber (1997)) and a variation
of the interregional input-output (IRIO) framework (Canning and Wang, 2004)
and maintains consistency of the regional input-output table with the national
one (Jahn, 2016). Literature that compares different non-survey-based methods
to derive location quotients shows that the approach of Flegg and Webber (1997)
outperforms others, in particular since it simultaneously accounts for the size of
the selling industry, the purchasing industry and the region (Kowalewski, 2013).
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Not only do regions but also production sectors differ with respect to their
vulnerability to floods. This aspect is taken into account through aggregating
the 44 production sectors of the 2008 Swiss Input-Output Table to the three
production sectors s = {I, II, III}. I denotes the primary sector, which includes
agriculture and forestry in particular. II represents the industry sector, while III
is the tertiary sector that includes services. A higher disaggregation is because
of data availability problems not possible. To identify the inter-sectoral flow of
(intermediate) goods and services between sectors and regions, we first need to
estimate sectoral output at the smallest available administrative unit, which is
the community level. We use cantonal data on sector output and employment
data in full-time equivalents on community level to estimate sectoral output on
community level, assuming that employment data are a good proxy for sectoral
output on community level. Finally, we again aggregate community data with
respect to regions and sectors. Data on land use and productivity are provided
by the BFS and allow us to determine the use of production factors land, capital
and labor depending on sector and region.
4.3.2 Damage
To construct damage parameter of reference floods, hydrological information
about the type of flood, the expected return period and the dependence on climate
change are used together with WSL data on estimated damage. During the last
two decades, Switzerland was affected exceptionally often by severe floods, which
mostly have a return period greater than 150 years. We selected two out of
12 major floods that hit Switzerland since the 1970s. Both differ strongly with
respect to the underlying hydrological process, the affected region, the duration
and the damage they caused: The first reference flood, F-99, persisted from
February to May 1999 and affected the catchments of Thur, Aare, Linthkanal
and Bodensee. This event caused estimated market damage of about 577.25
million CHF (WSL, 2014). In contrast to 1999, the second reference flood, in
August 2005, lasted only five days. However, this flood in the catchments of Aare
and Reuss was the largest historical event in terms of damage, which amounted
to about 3109.3 million CHF (FOEN, 2008). Table 4.1 summarizes the main
characteristics of these two events.
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Characteristics Damage Parameter
Reference
Flood
Catchment Return
period
Damages
in mCHF
Duration
ACf,r
Lr
μf,r
Durf,r
12
DLf,r(t)
05/1999
Thur,Aare,
Linthkanal,
Bodensee
> 150 751.1 3 month
l 0.134 0.1
0.33
0.004
m 0.303 0.2 0.020
h 0.555 0.3 0.056
08/2005
Aare,
Reuss
> 150,
30
3109.3 5 days
l 0.262 0.1
0.21
0.007
m 0.553 0.3 0.041
h 0.686 0.4 0.069
Table 4.1: Characteristics of selected reference floods
Based on (1) WSL data on flood damage on community level and (2) BFS
data on community areas, we are able to derive the damage parameter Af,r(t)
and Durf,r(t). We do not know the exact value of Af,r(t), because there are no
data on the exact share of the damaged area in every community. However, what
we know is, which community is affected and its areaACf,r(t). Thus, we have to
assume a share μr of the given area that is affected, i.e. Af,r(t) = μrA
C
f,r(t).
Because region l covers also a high share of communities that ar not affected at
all, we assume μr=l < μr=h,m. The impact of the assumed values (see table 4.5)
will be revealed in the sensitivity analysis.
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4.3.3 Adaptation Strategies
Remember, there are two crucial characteristics of adaptation to floods in
Switzerland, we have to account for in our analysis: (1) There is a time lag
between the decision to adapt (proactively) and the first effects of adaptation
measures if a flood occurs. (2) The federal political system in Switzerland
allows for different financing schemata. The Federal Government and/or regional
authorities (at different levels canton, community) can be in response. Table 4.2
summarizes the characteristics of the main possible adaptation measure to floods
in Switzerland.
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Proactive measures (all, except mobile walls, and alarm systems) need a lead
time between 10 and 30 years. Additionally we assume that there is a time
lag between the decision to adapt and the first actual expenditure to finance
adaptation. Therefore, and as our model runs in 5 year time intervals, the
parameter v can take values between two and five and is set to v = 3 initially.
While decision making and target group of infrastructural incentive systems and
structural measures are rather in hands of regional authorities, information and
persuasion policies are in hands of the national government. Remember, that we
assume regional adaption expenditure to be more efficient than national ones,
i.e. ψR ≥ ψN . Major reasons are: (1) National authorities are not allowed to
discriminate between regions. While national law applies in all regions equally,
regional regulations are adapted to the specific characteristics of the respective
region. (2) Using national instead of regional funds is strictly preferred by regional
authorities and thus the political process of acquiring national funds may result
in a politically driven and not necessarily most effective (in terms of preventing
damage) allocation of adaptation expenditure to regions. (3) Regional authorities
may be better informed about the vulnerability and adaptation capacity of their
region and (4) the transformation of the enhanced knowledge of research and
monitoring measures (responsibility of the Federal Government) into policy is
usually uncertain and long-lasting7.
4.4 Scenarios
There are two characteristics through which the scenarios are classified we use in
our counterfactual analysis. These are the type of a flood on the one hand and
the schema for financing adaptation measures on the other.
4.4.1 Type of Floods
As mentioned above there are two reference floods. Based on their characteristics,
we assume in the following three flood scenarios: Scenario F-99 assumes a 1999-
like flood and Scenario F-05 a 2005-like flood to hit Switzerland in 2040. The
third scenario F-9905 assumes a 1999-like flood to hit Switzerland in 2025 and a
2005-like flood to hit Switzerland in 2055 (see Table 4.3).
7see sources no 2,3,4,11,13,16,20 in appendix E
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Flood Scenarios
F-99
F-05
F-9905
Table 4.3: Flood scenarios
4.4.2 Funding of Adaptation Strategies
In order to analyze the impact of different financing strategies on welfare,
production output and damage prevention, three options for financing adaptation
are considered. We differentiate not only between the regional or national
authority that is in charge, but also between funding adaptation measures by
taxes on output and land. Of course, financing through other sales or income
tax is possible as well. Table 4.4 gives an overview on the three funding
Schema. In the first one (R), the regional government levies taxes on land. In
the second one (N), the national government taxes the output of production
sectors, which is mobile across regions. In the third one (T ), we assume a
financial equalization approach between the two governmental levels. While
regional governments levy a tax on land (exogenously determined), the national
government levies an (endogenous) production tax in order to co-finance regional
adaptation via transfers (TRr) to the regional government. In all three scenarios,
the governments budgets are balanced period by period, i.e. their total revenue
equals their total expenditure for adaptation measures and transfers.
Remember, we aim for optimal adaptation. Consequently, the level of
adaptation expenditure is determined by the decision rule price of adaptation
expenditure in region r and sector s equals the value of marginal benefits
(prevented damage) of adaptation (see equation 4.6). Table 4.4 summarizes
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the three different funding scenarios to finance adaptation expenditure and the
budget constraints of the responsible regional and/or national governments that
are balanced period-by-period.
Funding scenario Budget constraint
R Adaptation is exclusively fi-
nanced by regional governments
Regional government:
τLr (t)p
L
r (t)Lr = ADr(t)
N Adaptation is exclusively fi-
nanced by the national govern-
ment
National government:∑
r,s τ
x
r,s(t)p
x
r,s(t)xr,s(t) =
∑
r ADr(t)
T Adaptation is financed by ex-
ogenous regional land tax and
financial equalization, i.e. the
national government pays trans-
fers to regional governments
Regional governments:
τLr (t)p
L
r (t)TRr = ADr(t)
National government:∑
r,s τ
x
r,s(t)p
x
r,s(t)xr,s(t) = TRr
Table 4.4: Funding options
Through combining options to finance adaptation with flood events, we get
nine scenarios in total. Nicknames of scenarios are combination of short cuts
introduced above, for example F05− R would indicate a scenario, where a 2005
like flood hits Switzerland in 2040 (F05) and where adaptation is financed by
regional governments only.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Direct and Indirect Impacts of Floods without
Adaptation
Let us start the analysis by considering the direct and indirect impacts of 1999
(F −99) and/or 2005 (F05) like reference floods on an unadapted Swiss economy.
For comparison the benchmark economy is by assumption the Swiss economy,
which is neither hit by any flood nor adapted to floods. First, we analyze direct
impacts of all three flood scenarios. The third column of table 4.5 shows the
damage parameter, which we derived according to the damage function approach
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proposed by Carrera et al. (2015) and which are based on the parameter specified
in table 4.2. Remember, we have only information on the overall damage in
land supply but no information about the share of land used by households or
firms that is destroyed. The reduction of the overall land supply increases the
price for land and consequently reduces the demand for land by households and
the production sectors. However, while in high exposed regions r = h, private
households land use is reduced (slightly) stronger than by all production sectors
together, we see the opposite impact in medium and low exposed regions r = m, l.
Damage
parameter
Direct impacts Indirect impacts on
Flood
Scenario
Region DLf,r(t) l
H
r
∑
s l
F
r,s s = I s = II s = III Welfare
F − 99
l 0.004 −0.246 −0.477 −0.044 0.305 −0.062 −0.049
m 0.020 −1.841 −2.079 0.158 −0.170 −0.149 −0.056
h 0.056 −5.817 −5.492 0.206 −0.121 −0.047 −0.065
F − 05
l 0.005 −0.322 −0.589 −0.028 0.305 −0.058 −0.056
m 0.034 −3.224 −3.488 0.175 −0.170 −0.154 −0.067
h 0.057 −5.908 −5.596 0.252 −0.119 −0.044 −0.072
F−9905
l
like F − 99 in 2025 and
like F − 05 in 2055
−0.028 0.305 −0.058 −0.056
m 0.175 −0.170 −0.154 −0.067
h 0.252 −0.119 −0.044 −0.072
Table 4.5: Damage - direct and indirect impacts (change rate in percent) caused
by reference floods in an unadapted economy
While direct impacts of floods capture only damage caused by destroyed land,
indirect impacts take general equilibrium effects into account. Table 4.6 presents
the percentage change of prices compared to the baseline values for land in region
r = h caused by reference floods in an unadapted economy. As expected, the price
of land increases in consequence of increased scarcity of land that is on the one
hand used as production input and entering the utility function of households on
the other.
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<2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080
F-99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.23 1.10 0.70 0.90 1.15 1.47 0.00 0.00 0.00
F-05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.66 1.10 1.41 1.80 1.15 1.47 0.00 0.00 0.00
F-9905 0.00 8.32 1.06 1.36 1.30 1.10 1.41 9.91 2.30 2.94 1.85 2.38 3.03
Table 4.6: Change of price for land in region r = h in percentage
Column 6 - 8 of table 4.5 summarize the impact of the three reference floods
on sector outputs in the three regions (summed over all periods). Independently
of the flood scenario and the region, the overall output in sector III decreases
(by between −0.058 and −0.357%). Also the output of sector II in regions
r = m,h decreases (by between −0.17 and −0.401%), independently of the flood
scenario. To compensate the decrease of the production output in sector II (by
between −0.119 and −0.282%) and III (by between −0.044 and −0.106%) in
region r = h, the production output of sector I in region r = m,h increases
(by between 0.158 and 0.567%) as well as the production output of sector II
in region r = l (by between 0.305 and 0.715%). While the output of sector II
and III in region r = h decreases clearly, the output of the clearly smallest
production sector I is increased. Overall, regional output decreases in region
r = h, depending on the scenario, by between −0.07 and −0.167% and increases
in region r = l, depending on the scenario by between 0.109 and 0.258%. Regional
welfare decreases in all flood scenarios by between −0.049 and −0.116% (table
4.5, column 9). Independently of the flood scenario, the welfare loss is largest in
high exposed regions r = h and smallest in region r = l.
4.5.2 Direct and Indirect Impacts of Floods in an Opti-
mally Adapted Economy
In contrast to section 4.5.1, we now analyze the impact of reference floods in case
of an optimal adapted economy depending on the financing options discussed
above. Remember, all results presented in chapter 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 include
autonomous adaptation by the economy in consequence of price changes etc.
However, this chapter summarizes the impacts of the explicit implementation
of adaptation measures. Table 4.7 summarizes for every combination of flood
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and financing scenarios the (1) direct impacts (residual damage), (2) adaptation
expenditure, (3) tax rates and (4) indirect impacts on regional and sectoral
output as well as welfare in reaction on price changes. In case of financing
scenarios R and T , optimal adaptation results in a reduction of land supply
by −0.005% in region r = l, by −0.006% in region r = m and −0.003% in region
r = h. Because of information asymmetries, nationally financed adaptation (N)
is less efficient. Consequently, compared to scenario R and T despite of higher
adaptation expenditure less land damage are reduced. In most vulnerable regions
r = h land supply is reduced by between −0.025 and −0.031%. However, this is
a strong improvement compared to a reduction of land supply by about −5.5 to
−6% in case without adaptation at comparably low costs. Because of the higher
tax base, tax rates are lower if adaption is financed by output tax compared to
land tax.
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F
r,s Output in s = Welfare
in t = 2040 bzw.
t = 2025, 2055
I II III ∗100
F-
99
R
l −0.005 −0.005 1.450 0.011 1.281 0.014 −0.015 −0.018
m −0.006 −0.006 1.943 0.017 −0.113 −0.043 −0.176 −0.023
h −0.003 −0.003 2.465 0.012 2.052 0.042 0.047 −0.018
N
l −0.002 −0.003 2.001
0.0005
4.766 −0.013 −0.093 −0.045
m −0.009 −0.010 2.142 2.524 −0.198 −0.006 −0.048
h −0.031 −0.029 2.094 −0.126 −0.128 −0.018 −0.053
T
l −0.005 −0.005 1.450
0.0005
5.069 −0.096 −0.068 −0.038
m −0.006 −0.006 1.943 2.956 −0.163 0.034 −0.041
h −0.003 −0.003 2.465 −0.132 −0.129 −0.017 −0.040
F-
05
R
l −0.005 −0.005 1.525 0.011 1.429 0.010 0.03 −0.018
m −0.006 −0.006 2.120 0.018 −0.009 −0.006 −0.172 −0.024
h −0.003 −0.003 2.471 0.012 1.429 0.010 0.031 −0.018
N
l −0.002 −0.004 2.025
0.0005
5.650 0.001 −0.092 −0.046
m −0.015 −0.016 2.148 2.699 −0.376 0.009 −0.051
h −0.027 −0.025 2.160 −0.135 −0.129 −0.018 −0.052
T
l −0.005 −0.005 1.525
0.0005
9.602 −0.040 −0.168 −0.030
m −0.006 −0.006 2.120 −0.179 −0.376 0.022 −0.031
h −0.003 −0.003 2.471 −0.129 −0.128 −0.016 −0.036
F-
9905
R
l −0.005 −0.005 2.975 0.011 0.304 0.011 0.007 −0.028
m −0.006 −0.006 4.063 0.018 −0.165 0.021 −0.017 −0.035
h −0.003 −0.003 4.937 0.012 0.096 −0.072 −0.011 −0.028
N
l −0.001/
−0.002
−0.003/
−0.004
4.047 2025:
0.0005,
2055:
0.0004
9.473 0.065 −0.171 −0.084
m −0.018/
−0.015
−0.012/
−0.010
4.430 2.049 −0.403 −0.078 −0.090
h −0.025/
−0.027
−0.028/
−0.029
4.213 −0.300 −0.302 −0.041 −0.092
T
l −0.005 −0.005 2.975 2025:
0.0005,
2055:
0.0004
18.294 −0.130 −0.258 −0.097
m −0.006 −0.006 4.063 −0.497 −0.485 −0.092 −0.100
h −0.003 −0.003 4.937 −0.274 −0.298 −0.041 −0.097
Table 4.7: Optimal adaptation scenario
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With respect to output changes the results can be summarized as follows:
(1.) In financing scenario R, highly vulnerable regions r = h, and in scenario T
and N , less vulnerable regions (r = m and/or l) increase their production
output. Figure 4.1 illustrates this result for flood scenario F-05 and
aggregated over all three sectors.
(2.) dependently of the flood and the financing scenario, sector II ′s output tends
to decrease most and sector I outputs tends decrease less (or even increases).
Although the first production sector depends most on land, this sector even
increases its output in some scenarios. Because about 1/3 of the Swiss area are
agricultural areas while only ca. 7.5% of the Swiss area are used for settlement
and by the second and third production sector (BFS, 2016), the relative scarcity
of land is the lowest in the first production sector. Additionally, we can, due to
data availability problems, not distinguish which share of land (meaning used by
which sector or by households for settlement) is hit most by a flood and therefore
not account for eventually larger damage in land used by the first in contrast to
the second and third production sector.
Figure 4.1: Percentage change of regional GDP in an unadapted economy (left)
and depending on the financing scenario (right)
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With respect to welfare changes there are two conclusions mainly:
(1.) The welfare loss from floods in an optimally adapted economy is smallest
in case of financing scenario R (regional government, tax on land).
(2.) The impact on welfare, if adaptation to F-99 and F-05 is financed by the
national government with an output tax (Scenario N), is worse, compared
to the situation that it is financed via transfers (Scenario T ). However, in
flood scenario F-9905 optimal adaptation has a worse effect on welfare if it
is financed via transfers and land tax (Scenario T ) in contrast to a national
output tax (Scenario N).
Figure 4.2 shows the impact of the reference flood F-05 on welfare in the
three regions, without explicit adaption and depending on the scenario to finance
adaptation.
Figure 4.2: Percentage change of welfare in an unadapted economy (left) and
depending on the financing scenario (right)
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4.5.3 Insights from Sensitivity Analysis
As usual in General Equilibrium analyses, results very much depend on numerical
inputs and model parameter specification. To evaluate the impact of defined
values for elasticity of substitution for intermediate inputs from other sectors (vs),
inputs from different sectors in the consumption aggregate (σ) and capital and
labor input in value added (%), we conduct a sensitivity analysis assuming instead
of {v = σ = % = 2} the values {v = σ = 4, % = 1.2} and {v = σ = 0.5, % = 4},
respectively.8 With respect to direct damage in an unadapted economy we find,
independently of the flood scenario, for the parameter combination {v = σ =
0.5, % = 4} a slightly stronger decrease in land use by firms and a slightly less
strong decrease in land use by households in region r = l and r = m. The opposite
effect is true for region r = h. The most obvious difference concerning indirect
impacts is the considerable adjustment of outputs depending on the production
sector, independently of the region and the flood scenario. The output of sector
I increases strongly (by between 10.4 and 24.5%) in the least vulnerable region
r = l. However, the output in sector II and III decreases. We find a less
strong reduction of welfare (between −0.035 and −0.085%) for the parameter
combination {v = σ = 0.5, % = 4} compared to the parameter combination
{v = σ = % = 2} (between −0.049 and −0.116%).
If we assume elasticities of substitution {v = σ = 4, % = 1.2} we again
find that in regions r = l,m the reduction in land use by firms is stronger and
reduction of land use by households is less strong, compared to the initial situation
{v = σ = % = 2}. However, in the most vulnerable region r = h, we find the
opposite impact. The impact of floods in an unadapted economy on regional and
sectoral output changes only marginally and only in terms of the size, not in the
direction of the impact. But, compared to the initial situation {v = σ = % = 2}
and the parameter combination {v = σ = 0.5, % = 4} we find the worse impact
on welfare (between −0.062 and −0.09% in Flood Scenario F − 99 and F − 05).
8A detailed overview on the results of the sensitivity analysis can be found in appendix 4.D
and 4.C
121
4.6 Conclusion
Within the framework of an intertemporal General Equilibrium approach, this
paper gives insights into direct and indirect impacts of floods as well as optimal
flood adaption from a regionally diversified perspective. Furthermore it compares
different strategies for financing adaptation in a federalist system, where local and
national governmental authorities, which have different information, interplay in
the provision of the local public good.
Our results suggest that general equilibrium effects are crucial, if national
adaptation strategies should be defined. Regions, which are not directly affected
from flood events nevertheless suffer from indirect effects and therefore might also
be interested in an efficient adaptation. Our approach in particular accounts for
secondary effects and hence allows for differentiating between welfare losses and
damage in the output, i.e. market damage that result from lower land supply and
total demand for consumption goods. Furthermore, based upon our results we are
convinced that our approach to define regions depending on their vulnerability
to floods and not on area municipalities gives insights on (1) how areas, which
are indirectly affected via general equilibrium effects, suffer, (2) if and how the
cooperation between affected and not affected regions in case of adaptation to
floods is feasible.
Conditional to the assumption that because of information asymmetries,
regionally financed adaptation is more effective, we are able to show that the
least negative impact on regional output and welfare is achieved if adaptation to
flood events is financed and implemented by regional governments. Only output
in region r = m decreases marginally less, if adaptation to flood events is financed
by a national output tax. While in flood scenarios F-99 and F-05, the results of
the transfer scenario T are predominantly better compared to a scenario, where
the national government finances adaptation (always in terms of welfare), the
transfer scenario T has the worst impact on output and welfare if we assume flood
scenario F-9905. Obviously, there are several options for extending the present
analysis further. The most important one could be to introduce uncertainty by
using a stochastic version of the model. On the one hand this is a reasonable
assumption in the context of climate extreme events, which are characterized by
122
low probability to occur, but a high impact if they occur. On the other hand, the
possibility to simulate these models may be limited. We leave these extensions to
future research. Furthermore, if special adaption measures should be analyzed,
it would be possible to account for the fact that adaptation expenditure are
concentrated on specific sectors.
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4.C Sensitivity Analysis - Damage
Damage
Parameter
Direct Impacts Indirect Impacts
Flood
Scenario
RegionDLf,r(t) l
H
r
∑
s l
F
r,s s = I s = II s = III Welfare
F − 99
l 0.004 −0.254 −0.473 10.493 −0.150 −0.074 −0.035
m 0.020 −1.859 −2.070 0.132 −0.183 −0.156 −0.041
h 0.056 −5.804 −5.498 0.241 −0.066 −0.005 −0.052
F − 05
l 0.005 −0.331 −0.584 10.404 −0.148 −0.072 −0.040
m 0.034 −3.244 −3.478 0.173 −0.178 −0.156 −0.051
h 0.057 −5.894 −5.603 0.247 −0.062 −0.003 −0.057
F − 9905
l
like F − 99 in 2025 and
like F − 05 in 2055
24.537 −0.350 −0.172 −0.064
m 0.372 −0.423 −0.366 −0.074
h 0.603 −0.153 −0.009 −0.085
Table 4.10: Sensitivity analysis for v = σ = 0.5, % = 4
Damage
Parameter
Direct impacts Indirect impacts on
Flood
Scenario
RegionDLf,r(t) l
H
r
∑
s l
F
r,s s = I s = II s = III Welfare
F − 99
l 0.004 −0.236 −0.482 −0.054 0.322 −0.047 −0.062
m 0.020 −1.818 −2.091 0.150 −0.149 −0.153 −0.068
h 0.056 −5.833 −5.483 0.174 −0.196 −0.112 −0.078
F − 05
l 0.005 −0.310 −0.595 −0.012 0.325 −0.041 −0.076
m 0.034 −3.198 −3.501 0.174 −0.150 −0.147 −0.087
h 0.057 −5.928 −5.586 0.217 −0.198 −0.108 −0.090
Table 4.11: Sensitivity analysis for v = σ = 4, % = 1.2
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4.D Sensitivity Analysis - Adaptation Scenarios
F
lo
od
Sc
en
ar
io
A
da
pt
at
io
n
Sc
e-
na
ri
o
R
eg
io
n
Direct impact
A
da
pt
at
io
n
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e
in
m
ill
C
H
F
T
ax
ra
te
∗1
00
Indirect impact
lHr
∑
s l
F
r,s Output Welfare
in t = 2040 bzw.
t = 2025, 2055
I II III ∗100
F-
99
R
l −0.005 −0.005 1.450 0.011 1.488 0.012 0.018 −0.016
m −0.006 −0.006 1.943 0.017 −0.147 −0.074 −0.173 −0.021
h −0.003 −0.003 2.465 0.012 1.220 0.007 0.020 −0.017
N
l −0.002 −0.003 2.070
0.0005
6.947 −0.106 0.004 −0.034
m −0.010 −0.011 2.093 3.108 −0.377 −0.101 −0.036
h −0.030 −0.029 2.100 −0.168 −0.130 −0.019 −0.042
T
l −0.005 −0.005 1.450
0.0005
10.826 −0.118 −0.015 −0.031
m −0.006 −0.006 1.943 0.616 −0.368 −0.272 −0.032
h −0.003 −0.003 2.465 −0.175 −0.129 −0.018 −0.034
F-
05
R
l −0.005 −0.005 1.525 0.011 0.536 0.008 0.010 −0.017
m −0.006 −0.006 2.120 0.018 −0.068 −0.015 −0.054 −0.023
h −0.004 −0.003 2.471 0.012 0.406 −0.041 0.002 −0.017
N
l −0.002 −0.003 2.138
0.0005
9.532 −0.120 −0.066 −0.037
m −0.015 −0.016 2.150 2.875 −0.376 −0.125 −0.042
h −0.027 −0.026 2.151 −0.144 −0.129 −0.018 −0.044
T
l −0.005 −0.005 1.525
0.0005
7.850 −0.118 −0.037 −0.036
m −0.006 −0.006 2.120 3.502 −0.325 −0.112 −0.039
h −0.003 −0.003 2.471 −0.150 −0.129 −0.018 −0.038
F-
9905
R
l −0.005 −0.005 2.975 0.011 3.268 0.002 0.021 −0.022
m −0.006 −0.006 4.063 0.017 −0.319 −0.284 −0.249 −0.030
h −0.003 −0.003 4.937 0.012 3.223 0.038 0.055 −0.024
N
l −0.001/
−0.002
−0.003 4.238 2025:
0.0005
2055:
0.0004
7.473 −0.072 0.081 −0.058
m −0.008/
−0.015
−0.010/
−0.016
4.298 4.279 −0.527 −0.172 −0.063
h −0.031/
−0.027
−0.030/
−0.026
4.240 −0.393 −0.305 −0.044 −0.067
T
l −0.005 −0.005 2.975 2025:
0.0005
2055:
0.0016
19.174 −0.300 −0.088 −0.078
m −0.006 −0.006 4.063 5.319 −0.569 −0.315 −0.081
h −0.003 −0.003 4.937 −0.347 −0.304 −0.043 −0.080
Table 4.12: Optimal adaptation - sensitivity analysis for v = σ = 0.5, % = 4
127
F
lo
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Sc
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Direct impact
A
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n
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e
in
m
ill
C
H
F
T
ax
ra
te
∗1
00
Indirect impact on
lHr
∑
s l
F
r,s Output Welfare
in t = 2040 bzw.
t = 2025, 2055
I II III ∗100
F-
99
R
l −0.005 −0.005 1.450 0.011 0.405 0.060 −0.184 −0.015
m −0.006 −0.006 1.943 0.017 0.598 0.324 −0.180 −0.019
h −0.004 −0.003 2.465 0.012 2.382 −0.032 0.181 −0.017
N
l −0.001 −0.003 2.097
0.0005
0.866 −0.001 −0.167 −0.065
m −0.009 −0.011 2.107 −0.153 0.486 0.056 −0.061
h −0.031 −0.029 2.096 −0.088 −0.126 −0.018 −0.058
T
l −0.005 −0.005 1.450
0.0005
0.296 −0.049 −0.167 −0.025
m −0.006 −0.006 1.943 0.012 0.484 0.180 −0.024
h −0.004 −0.003 2.465 0.019 −0.125 −0.016 −0.033
F-
05
R
l −0.005 −0.005 1.525 0.011 0.264 −0.018 −0.128 −0.022
m −0.006 −0.006 2.120 0.018 4.900 0.195 −0.390 −0.028
h −0.004 −0.003 2.471 0.012 1.050 0.286 0.240 −0.021
N
l −0.001 −0.003 2.145
0.0005
0.931 0.144 −0.167 −0.058
m −0.015 −0.017 2.140 −0.170 0.176 −0.012 −0.064
h −0.027 −0.026 2.154 −0.079 −0.127 −0.017 −0.065
T
l −0.005 −0.005 1.525
0.0005
1.310 −0.020 −0.108 −0.044
m −0.006 −0.006 2.120 −0.176 0.340 0.031 −0.046
h −0.004 −0.003 2.471 −0.090 −0.127 −0.016 −0.046
Table 4.13: Optimal adaptation - sensitivity analysis for v = σ = 4, % = 1.2
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